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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three relatively independent chapters that study 
individual choice behavior from various angles. Chapter 1 is aimed at improving 
the existing discrete choice models. Of the commonly used models, the probit class 
is computationally infeasible for problems with more than a few alternatives, and 
the GEV class, including the widely used logit and nested logit models, suffers 
from the restriction of homoscedastic disturbances. We relax the homoscedasticity 
restriction on the GEV class to achieve both functional flexibility and computational 
feasibility. The heteroscedastic logit/nested logit models are of particular practical 
interest. 
Chapter 2 studies voting behavior in mass elections using data from the 1968 
and 1980 presidential elections. We discuss theoretical and methodological issues 
in the specification, comparative study, and empirical testing of the rational voter 
models, and explore the methodological treatment of voter heterogeneity. While 
the standard models do not predict voting turnout well, we obtain clear evidence 
of strategic voting in the candidate choice decision in three candidate elections. 
v 
The data suggest voter information as one source of voter heterogeneity which in-
troduces heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedastic logit model developed in Chapter 
1 is therefore applied and is shown to outperform the standard logit model and to 
reveal strong effects of voter information on the turnout decision. 
Chapter 3 studies choice behavior in congressional career decisions. Previous 
research largely focuses on the binary choices of retiring vs. seeking reelection or 
seeking higher office vs. seeking reelection. Using data from the 80th through the 
99th congresses, we rigorously explore the congressmen's choice from all available 
career options, and discuss the effects of variables on both pairwise comparisons 
of the alternatives and on the unconditional probabilities of choosing the con-
gressional career options. Our findings suggest that formal positions held and 
previous vote margins do not figure into House members' career decisions, and 
being a Republican per se does not encourage progressive ambition. We also see 
that a number of factors previously identified as predisposing House members to 
seek higher office also affect retirement decision. 
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Making choices is a central feature of human existence. An individual constantly 
faces choice situations in all aspects of life. Decisions on labor force participation, 
occupation, residential and work location, travel modes, durable goods purchases, 
voting participation, and vote choices are but a few examples. 
Understanding individual choice behavior, however, is not only important for 
its own sake, but also vital to the understanding of many interesting aggregate 
phenomena, because aggregate behavior is the result of individual decisions. In-
deed, the aggregate level of voting turnout, the results of a presidential election, 
the market demand for a commodity, the composition of the labor force, and even 
the size of the population, etc., are all results of individual choices. Therefore, 
the understanding of individual choice behavior occupies a core position in the 
understanding of aggregate political, economic, and social phenomena. 
This dissertation presents a collection of three essays that study individual 
choice behavior from different angles and in different settings. Each essay con-
stitutes a chapter of the dissertation. The chapters are relatively independent in 
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style and content, but are connected by the unifying theme of modeling individual 
choice behavior under certain rationality assumptions. Chapter 1 is methodolog-
ical in nature, it concerns the improvement of the existing statistical models of 
individual choice behavior. Chapter 2 and 3 study choice behavior of two impor-
tant groups of individuals: the voters and the legislators, respectively, who are 
largely responsible for the operation of the democratic system and the outcomes of 
public policy. 
Chapter 1, more precisely, considers discrete choice models. 1 For a decision 
maker facing a finite, exhaustive set of mutually exclusive alternatives, a discrete 
choice model specifies the probabilities of choosing each alternative in terms of 
observable independent variables and a set of unknown parameters. The values 
of the parameters are estimated from a sample of observed choices made by the 
decision makers. The effects of the independent variables on the choice proba-
bilities, and the changes in choice probabilities following a change in exogenous 
variables, can then be inferred based on the estimated model. Many choice situa-
tions can be described by discrete choice models. In fact, all the choice situations 
mentioned in the beginning of the introduction are examples where discrete choice 
models are potentially useful, so are the choice situations studied in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3. A good choice model should be functionally flexible (i.e., should 
allow general patterns of heterogeneity) and computational feasible, and should 
1Chapter 1 is a modified and expanded version of my second-year paper presented to the Social 
Science Seminar, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, June 11, 1990. 
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have good explanatory power in empirical applications. Of the existing (para-
metric) models, the most commonly used ones are the probit, the logit and the 
nested logit models. The latter two belong to the family of the generalized extreme 
value (GEV) model. The probit model allows general structure of the covariance 
matrix of the disturbances, hence enjoys functional flexibility. However, it is com-
putationally intractable for problems with more than a few alternatives. The GEV 
class is amenable to computation even for large choice sets, but it suffers from the 
restriction of homoscedastic disturbances, which is not plausible in many choice 
situations. When heteroscedastidty is present, application of the GEV class is 
problematic, resulting in inconsistent estimators, incorrect test statistics, and mis-
leading forecasts. The goal of Chapter 1 is to relax this homogeneity restriction 
of the GEV model to obtain a class of choice models that are both functionally 
flexible and computationally feasible. The application of one of our new models, 
the heteroscedastic logit model, can be found in chapter 2, where it proves to be 
superior to the standard model in explaining voting turnout decisions. 
Chapter 2 studies voters' choice behavior in mass elections. How voters make 
up their minds is one of the most thoroughly studied subjects in political science 
because it has important consequences for the operation of democratic systems. 
Despite all the research that has been done in this area, however, many important 
issues remain controversial, or ambiguous, or largely unexamined. Among them 
are some theoretical and methodological issues concerning the specification and 
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comparative study of various rational voter models for the turnout decision, the 
formal testing of strategic voting behavior in the candidate choice decision in the 
presence of a minor party candidate, and the methodological treatment of voter 
heterogeneity. "Rational voter models" are an important class of voting mod-
els which assume voters to be "rational" in making their voting decisions. Such 
models provide explicit, precise theoretical bases for voting decisions and their 
analysis, and lead to testable hypotheses about voting behavior. Two major mod-
els proposed in this tradition are the Downsian model based on expected utility 
maximization, and the "minmax regret" model based on a different decision rule in 
which voters minimize their maximum "regrets." For the voting turnout decision, 
the first model implies, operationally, that the interaction of the closeness of the race 
and the utility difference terms matter in the voting decision; while in the second 
model, only the utility difference terms matter. For the candidate choice decision, 
the Downsian model permits strategic voting, while the minmax regret model 
predicts sincere voting. Previous research is neither complete nor satisfactory in 
the empirical testing of these models. In testing the Downsian model in turnout 
decisions, previous research often fails to maintain the theoretical specification of 
the model; in comparing the two different turnout models, it often ignores data 
problems and settles for unreliable conclusions. Strategic voting behavior pre-
dicted by the Downsian model in multiple candidate election is seldomly tested 
against empirical data at all. And voter heterogeneity is another important topic 
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that has not received satisfactory treatment in previous research. It is the goal of 
Chapter 2 to explore these issues in detail and to improve our understanding of 
voting behavior. Using data from the 1968 and 1980 presidential elections, the 
chapter rigorously examines the performance of rational voter models in explain-
ing both voting turnout and vote choice decisions, and discusses a methodological 
treatment of voter heterogeneity inherited from diverged information levels. Our 
results show that standard rational voter models do not predict turnout decisions 
well, rather, it is social-psychological factors that are largely responsible for the 
variations in turnout decision making. For the candidate choice decision, however, 
the Downsian model does have significant explanatory power, reflecting the dis-
tinct nature of turnout and vote choice decisions, and providing clear evidence of 
strategic voting in the presence of a third candidate. Concerning voter heterogene-
ity, we show that voter information is an important source of heterogeneity, which, 
operationally, renders the standard homoscedastic voting models inappropriate. 
A heteroscedastic model developed in Chapter 1 is therefore applied, and is shown 
to significantly outperform the standard model, revealing stronger effects of voter 
information on the turnout decisions. 
Chapter 3 studies choice behavior in congressional career decisions. Except 
the few congressmen who died in office or were expelled or were appointed to 
other offices, at the end of each term most members of the House face a career 
choice situation: they can choose to run for reelection, or to retire, or to seek 
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other office if such an opportunity exists. A congressman's career choice decision 
reveals, of course, his motivation and direction of ambition, which lie at the heart 
of politics. Moreover, in the face of decreasing electoral competition, it is how 
such choices are made that increasingly determines the overall level of House 
turnover and the composition of the House membership, which in turn bears on 
the nature of public policy. Previous research on congressional career decisions 
mostly focuses on the binary choices of either seeking reelection versus seeking 
higher office or seeking reelection versus retiring, excluding members who choose 
the third alternative from the sample. Therefore, these studies do not analyze the 
unconditional probabilities of members choosing to retire, to seek reelection, or to 
run for higher office, but rather the conditional probabilities of choosing from a 
subset of alternatives given that the third alternative is not chosen. Conditional 
probabilities only draw an incomplete picture of the choice situation. Moreover, 
previous researchers often interpret variables affecting the conditional probabilities 
as affecting the unconditional probabilities. Doing so causes misunderstandings on 
the roles of the variables, and leads to failure of identifying relevant variables that 
enter the choice calculation. In Chapter 3, we seek to overcome the weaknesses in 
previous research and to study congressional career decisions in a rigorous fashion. 
We formulate and estimate an integrated model of congressional career decisions 
using data from the 80th through the 99th Congresses. Under certain rationality 
assumptions, we explore rigorously the choices of the congressmen among all 
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available career options. Employing a general choice model, we estimate and 
discuss not only the effects of relevant variables on pairwise comparisons of the 
alternatives (the conditional probabilities), but also the direction and extent of the 
effects of independent variables on the unconditional probabilities of choosing 
the congressional career options. While some of our findings confirm previous 
research or conform to expectations, others offer fresh insight into the nature of 
the decision making process. Notably, we find that formal positions held and 
previous vote margins do not figure into House members' career decisions, that 
being a Republican per se does not encourage progressive ambition, and that a 
congressman's age does not offer much information on his probability of choosing 
to run for reelection. We also see that a number of factors previously identified as 
predisposing House members to seek higher office also affect retirement decision. 
As mentioned earlier, the chapters are relatively independent in style and con-
tent. Nevertheless, they all contribute to the understanding of individual choice 
behavior, either by improving the methodology, or by adding to the substantive 
knowledge of choice behavior in political economy. The methodologies adopted 
in this dissertation are also readily applicable to other fields of social science. 
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Chapter 1 
A Heteroscedastic GEV Model 
1.1 Introduction 
Discrete choice models have found wide application in a variety of fields. They are 
receiving increasing attention in applied work because many empirically important 
decisions involve choices among discrete alternatives. Examples are decisions on 
labor force participation, occupation, residential and work location, travel modes, 
durable goods purchases, voting participation, and vote choices (see, for example, 
Barnard and Hensher 1989; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985; Dubin 1985; Dubin and 
McFadden 1984; Enberg et al. 1990; Lee and Cohen 1985; McFadden 1978, 1979; 
Palfrey and Poole 1987; and Train 1980). 
For a decision maker facing a finite and exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives, a choice model specifies the probabilities of choosing each alternative 
in terms of observable independent variables and a set of unknown parameters. 
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The values of the parameters are estimated from a sample of observed choices 
made by the decision makers. The effects of the independent variables on the 
choice probabilities, and the changes in choice probabilities following a change in 
exogenous variables, can then be inferred from the estimated model. Of the ex-
isting (parametric) models, the most commonly used ones are the probit, the logit 
and the nested logit models. The latter two belong to the family of the generalized 
extreme value (GEV) model. The probit model allows general structure of the co-
variance matrix of the disturbances, hence enjoys functional flexibility. However, 
it is computationally intractable for problems with more than a few alternatives. 
The GEV class is amenable to computation even for large choice set, but it suffers 
from the restriction of homoscedastic disturbances, which is not plausible in many 
choice situations. When heteroscedasticity is present, application of the GEV class 
is problematic, resulting in inconsistent estimators, incorrect test statistics, and 
misleading forecasts. In this chapter, we offer a generalization of the GEV model to 
avoid this restriction. We show that the resulting heteroscedastic models achieve 
both functional flexibility and computational feasibility. We then discuss the es-
timation techniques and statistical testing for violation of the assumptions of the 
standard models. Special attention is paid to the logit model and its properties 
are discussed in more detail, because the standard logit model is by far the most 
widely used model in applications and the heteroscedastic logit model has already 
proved its practical value in different fields (Chapter 2, Section 4; Dubin and Zeng 
10 CHAPIER 1. A HEl'EROSCEDASTIC GEV MODEL 
1991). The heteroscedastic nested logit model is also discussed. 
The chapter unfolds as follows: Section 2 provides the motivation and back-
ground for the work in this chapter by briefly reviewing the existing models and 
discussing their properties. Section 3 presents the improved GEV model and ad-
dresses issues in the estimation and hypothesis testing of the new model. Section 4 
focuses on the heteroscedastic logit model and discusses its properties in some de-
tail. The heteroscedastic nested logit model is also briefly discussed in this Section. 
Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
1.2 Discrete Choice Models 
Throughout this chapter, we consider choice models based on the assumption of 
stochastic utility maximization. Assume a sample of T decision makers, each 
choosing among It (for notational simplicity, we drop the subscript thereafter) dis-
crete alternatives. Each alternative i provides utility u,t to individual t. u,t consists 
of a deterministic component Vit (usually specified as Vit = L:f=1 xftf3k with x the 
observed characteristics and f3 the unknown parameters to be estimated) and an 
unobserved disturbance fit: Uit = v,t +fit· The stochastic utility maximization as-
sumption states that an individual t chooses alternative i if and only if it maximizes 
his stochastic utility, i.e., if and only if u,t > Ujt Vj =I i. Therefore the probability 
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that person t chooses alternative i from the set of all I alternatives is: 
Pit Pr{ Uit > Ujt Vj =J. i} 
(1.1) 
where f( t:tt, ... , t:It) is the joint density of the €it· Let F( t:tt, ... , t:1t) be the cumula-
tive distribution function of the disturbances. Equation (1.1) can be equivalently 
expressed as: 
(1.2) 
where Fi is the partial derivative ofF with respect to its ith argument. 
Equation (1.2) shows that a particular choice model is obtained by specifying 
the joint distribution of the disturbances.1 Criteria for choosing the distribution 
function of the disturbances include: 
1. Functional flexibility-it should allow general patterns of heterogeneity and 
interdependence of the disturbances; 
1 A choice model can also be obtained by directly specifying a set of choice probabilities. When 
the choice probabilities satisfy a set of compatibility conditions(BOsch-Supan,1990), they define a 
choice model compatible with stochastic utility maximization with an implied joint distribution of 
the distwbances. In this chapter, however, we proceed by specifying the distribution function of 
fit which generates the choice model. 
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2. Computational feasibility-the resulting model should be amenable to com-
putation; and 
3. Consistency with empirical evidence-it should have good explanatory power 
in empirical applications. 
The Probit model is obtained by assuming that the disturbances follow a mul-
tivariate normal distribution. In the random coefficients probit model, proposed by 
Housman and Wise (1978), the covariance matrix of the error terms is parameter-
ized such that the model allows correlation among the error terms and variation in 
tastes across individuals. The probit class thus allows general patterns of the co-
variance structure of the disturbances and hence enjoys great functional flexibility. 
However, probit choice probabilities involve multivariate integrals of dimension 
I- 1 when there are I alternatives, a feature that makes the model computationally 
infeasible for more than four or five alternatives. The model is therefore useful only 
for choice situations involving a small number of alternatives, which is a serious 
limitation of the model. 
The logit model results from the assumption that fit have an i.i.d. extreme value 
distribution:2 F( fit) = e-e-•ir (extreme value distribution with~ = 0 and () = 1). 
2t is (type 1) extreme value distributed if its distribution function is: F(t) = ezp{ -e -(•-019 }, 
where e is a location parameter and () is a positive scaling parameter. The variance of £ in this case 
is 1 I 67t282. 
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Then Pit has the form: 
I 




The logit model (1.3) allows a ready interpretation of the choice probabilities in 
terms of the relative representative utilities of the alternatives. The probabilities 
have closed form expressions and, hence, are easy to compute. Also, large num-
ber choice problems can be decomposed easily into smaller ones and estimated 
sequentially (with some loss of efficiency). Because of these advantages, the logit 
model has received wide use in many fields. However, this model requires that 
the disturbances are independent and identically distributed, and it suffers from 
the so-called ITA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) property. The ITA 
property holds if the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is not 
affected by the presence of other alternatives. The ITA property is not a plausible 
assumption in many cases (e.g., when the alternative sets contains choices that are 
close substitutes). 
The Nested logit model is an extension of the logit model that is not subject to the 
ITA property. In the nested logit model, alternatives are grouped into subsets, with 
"similar" alternatives falling into the same subset. The disturbance terms within 
the subsets are allowed to be correlated. To establish that the nested logit model 
is consistent with stochastic utility maximization motivated the development of 
the GEV (generalized extreme value) model (McFadden 1978). The GEV model is 
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obtained by assuming the following joint distribution function for the disturbances: 
F( ) _ { G( -qt -en)} Elt, •.• , EJt - exp - e , ... , e , (1.4) 
where G(Yi, .. . , Y1 ) is a nonnegative, homogeneous of degree one 3 function of 
Yi 2:: 0 with the properties that limY;-+oo G = +oo and that the zth order partial 
derivative of G with respect to any combination of distinct Y;'s is nonnegative if 1 
odd and nonpositive if 1 even. McFadden(1978) shows that under these conditions, 
(1.4) defines a multivariate extreme value distribution with corresponding choice 
probabilities 
P. = ev;tG·(etl}t evn)/G(evlt evn) •t • ' .•. ' ' ••• ' ' (1.5) 
where Gi is the partial derivative of G with respect to its i th argument. 
The GEV model is actually a class of models that include the logit and the nested 
logit models as special cases. It can be easily verified that if G(Y1, ... , Yi) = 'L{=1 Yi, 
then (1.5) reduces to the standard logit model. The nested logit model results from 
G(.) taking the form: 
J 
G(Yi, ... 'Yi) = ECE Y/1,."t", (1.6) 
k=l iElk 
where h c {1, ... ,I}, ut=1h = {1, ... , I}, and 0 < CTk ~ 1.4 Here the I alternatives 
3This was relaxed to degree I'> 0 later. See Ben-Akiva and Lerman(1985). 
4Equation (1.6) defines a two-level nested logit model. The results of this chapter are easily 
generalized to more than two-level tree structures. 
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are grouped into J subsets. The parameter a k can be interpreted as an index of 
the similarities of the disturbances within subset I k • 0 < ak ~ 1 is required for G 
to satisfy the conditions of the GEV model (McFadden 1978). When a k = 1, the 
model reduces to the multinomiallogit model. 
The GEV class preserves the computational convenience of the logit model in 
that it still has closed form expressions. In addition, it allows a general pattern of 
dependence among alternatives. Note that the marginal distribution fort it is given 
by 




where a;= G(O, 0, ... , 0, 1, 0, ... , 0). In general, therefore, the diSturbances are not 
identically distributed. Nor are they independent. 
Despite its advantages, the GEV class (including the logit, the nested logit mod-
els, etc) imposes a serious restriction on the disturbances. That is, all disturbances 
have identical variances (homoscedasticity). This is because (1.7) is an extreme 
value distribution with e = ln a; and () = 1, and hence the variance of fit is: 
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Furthermore, this fact holds regardless of the functional form of G. 
Other efforts to allow more general covariance structure of the logit disturbances 
include Steckel and Vanhonacker (1988)' s "heterogeneous conditionallogit model", 
Housman and Ruud (1987)'s "heteroscedastic rank ordered logit model" and Small 
(1987)'s "ordered GEV" model. Steckel and Vanhonacker's model assumes the 
error terms follow the following distribution: 
f·- a 
F(€j) = exp[-T;,Bexp(-T)J, 
where i indicates individuals, j indicates alternatives. T; > 0 is assumed to be 
distributed across the population according to a gamma distribution, and ,8 > 0 
is a scale parameter. The choice probabilities obtained from this distribution have 
quite complicated expressions and, although the model avoids IIA, it does not get 
around the homoscedasticity of the error terms. 
The rank ordered logit model proposed by Housman and Ruud is a general-
ization of the standard rank ordered logit model that takes into consideration the 
fact that people might rank the most preferred choice more carefully than least 
preferred ones. Ranking the most preferred alternative is thus based on a logit 
model that has a larger common variance of the error terms than the logit models 
used for ranking less preferred alternatives. We see that the basic logit models used 
here are still homoscedastic. 
Small's ordered GEV model is an extension of the nested logit model that allows 
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stochastic correlation among alternatives in dose proximity. Because it belongs to 
the GEV family, it is also homoscedastic. 
From the above review we see that all GEV models and their variations are 
subject to the restriction of homoscedastic error terms. The use of these models 
may cause serious problems in parameter estimation, statistical inference and fore-
casting when the true model is actually heteroscedastic (which is more often the 
case). In general, estimates of both the unknown parameters and the choice prob-
abilities will be inconsistent. Test statistics will be incorrect, and forecasting can be 
misleading. Horowitz (1981) demonstrates the consequences of this specification 
error using hypothetical data. It is shown that the damage is often serious enough 
to destroy the practical value of the model. The lack of a theoretical specification 
for a heteroscedastic logit model also causes difficulties in developing specification 
tests for the standard logit model. For example, Davidson and Mackinnon (1984) 
perform a LM test for heteroscedastidty in binary logit models. Because they do 
not have a theoretical framework of a heteroscedastic logit model as the alternative 
model, they base the test on a specification which they think "cannot properly 
be called a specification of heteroscedasticity" (Davidson and Mackinnon 1984, 
p.247).5 Hence Greene (1990, p.685) notes that the LM test for heteroscedasticity 
as described in Davidson and Mackinnon "is not well suited to the logit model." 
It is therefore clear that, to provide models that are better suited than the stan-
5Interesting enough, it turns out that their specification is a proper heteroscedastic logit model 
in our framework developed in the next section, and therefore the test they develop is a proper test. 
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dard GEV class in many empirical situations, and to facilitate the specification test 
for the standard models, the development of heteroscedastic GEV models, and a 
heteroscedastic logit model in particular, is necessary. 
1.3 A Heteroscedastic GEV Model 
We now present the heteroscedastic models. Intuitively, if var( cit) = Cis a constant, 
then var( t:;tf1;t) = OftC will be varying with O;t. Therefore we can modify the 
generalized extreme value distribution in a simple and straightforward way to 
introduce heteroscedasticity: 
A Heteroscedastic GEV Model 
Theorem 1 Let G(Yi, ... , Y[) be the generating function in the GEV model, i.e., G is a 
nonnegative function of (Yt, ... , Y[) 2: 0 with the following properties: 
1. G is homogeneous of degree J.l > 0; 
3. For any distinct (it, ... , i~c), fJkG/8Yi1 ••• fJYik is nonnegative if k is odd and non-
positive if k is even. 
Then, 
F- ( ) { G( -~1rllu -~It Bit)} ttt, ... , fit = exp - e , ... , e (1.8) 
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is a multivariate extreme value distribution function if e it > 0, Vi, 'Vt; and 
(1.9) 
defines a probability choice model consistent with stochastic utility maximization. When 
(1.10) 
where < ev•t1h > denotes a vector with its ith element being< ev•t 9t >. 
Proof: We first prove that F in (1.8) is a multivariate extreme value distri-
bution. We need to show that, first, if < E;t >-+ -oo, then F -+ 0; second, if 
< Eit >-+ +oo, then F = 1 and third, ak F I 8Eitt .•. 8E;kt ;:::: 0. For notational sim-
plicity, the subscript t's are dropped in this part. But the proof is valid for all 
t. 
Note that F(Et, .•. , E1) = F(E10t, ... , EJOI) where F is the distribution function 
in equation (1.4). So we have: 
lim F 
f;-+-oo Vi 
- F(-oo, ... ,-oo) = 0 
lim F - F( oo, ... '00) = 1 
f;-+oo Vi 
(1.11) 
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Equation (1.11) is valid for all ik. Hence F is a proper cumulative distribution 
function. 
The marginal distribution function for Eit is the F valued at Ejt = oo Vj f. i, i.e., 
F;t F(oo, ... , E;t, ... , oo) 
{ G(o -f&tlfit 0)} exp - , ... , e , ... , 
(1.12) 
where the third equality uses the fact that G is homogeneous of degree f.L· Since 
(1.12) is an extreme value distribution with location parameter~ = (lna;)/(JLO;t) 
and scale parameter 0 = 1/(JLO;t), F is a multivariate extreme value distribution. 
Note that equation (1.12) implies that the variance of Eit is ~( 0,:~-') 2 • Therefore, 
the marginal distributions for Eit are no longer homoscedastic. 
Next we derive the choice probabilities (1.9) and (1.10). Assume the distur-
bances follow the distribution in (1.8). Under the stochastic utility maximization 
assumption, the choice probabilities are given by (1.2). In our case, 
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Substituting this into equation (1.2), we have 




8· e- EB;, G ·(e-(v;,+E- Vjt)Blt e-EB;, e-(v;,+<- V]t )Bit )e- G(.)dc tt 1 ' ••• ' ' ••• ' .... 
- oo 
which is equation (1.9). 
21 
When Bit = Bu i.e., when there is heteroscedastidty across individuals only, we 
have: 
Pit 1: Bte_,o,e-(v;,+<)Bt(!-1-l)Gi( < ev,,B, > )exp{ -e-(v;,+e)Bti-IQ( < ev;,B, >)}de 
e-(~J-l)B,v" BtGi(.) 1: e-eB, e-(JL-l)eB, exp{ -G(. )e-~'v;,B, e-~'eB, }de. 
Pit - Q 1: e-~''8'exp{-G(.)e-~'v''8'e-~''8'}dc 
Qjoo 1 d (exp{ -e-JLv;,8'Ge-~''8'}) 






!.ev;,8'Gi( < ev;,8, > )/G( < ev;,8, > ). 
J.l 
The first equation uses the homogeneity of degree J.l of G and (hence) homo-
geneity of degree J.l- 1 of Gi. Q.E.D. 
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When f.l = 1 and O;t = 1, we get back the GEV model (1.5). Therefore the GEV 
model is a special case of our heteroscedastic model. So is the logit model, the 
nested logit model, etc. Take any G function that satisfies the conditions of the 
theorem, if we plug it into model (1.5), we obtain a homoscedastic model; if we 
plug it into (1.10), we get a model with heteroscedasticity across population only; 
and if we plug it into (1.9), we obtain a model with heteroscedasticity across the 
population as well as across alternatives. 
The heteroscedastic models developed in theorem 1 allows a very general co-
variance structure for the disturbances. It allows correlation and heteroscedasticity 
across alternatives as well as across individuals. Thus it is more flexible than the 
GEV model. In terms of computational convenience, the model has a similar closed 
form as the standard GEV model for (}it = Ot. In the more general case in which 
(}it =J Ot, there is not a single closed form for arbitrary G. However, the probabilities 
Pit only involve one dimensional integrals because Fi itself has a closed form. More-
over, the integrand has very good properties: it presents exponential decay and 
possesses a rather high degree of smoothness. Hence, the methods of numerical 
integration can be easily and efficiently applied, and we can expect high quality 
approximation and fast convergence (Davis and Robinowitz 1975). 
The heteroscedastic GEV models are nearly as flexible as the probit model, but 
have great advantages over the latter in terms of computational cost. When the 
number of alternatives is large (e.g.,Daganzo and Kusnic 1990, where the number 
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of alternatives is over 100), the probit model is not feasible and the heteroscedastic 
GEV model may be the only practical alternative that allows general covariance 
structure for the disturbances. 
Estimation 
The first issue in estimating the heteroscedastic GEV model is the parameteri-
zation of the unknown parameters, { 0 it}. There are a large number of parameters 
in the new model. We have one Bit for each alternative i and each individual t. 
We need to reduce the number of unknown parameters to a reasonable magnitude 
in order to allow meaningful estimation of the parameters. In econometrics work 
parameterization is a common practice to reduce the number of parameters. Exam-
ples can be found in Housman and WISe (1978), Davidson and Mackinnon (1984) 




where Zi is a vector of m observable attributes that vary with alternatives; Z t is 
a vector of n attributes that vary with t. a 1 is a vector of m parameters; and a 2 
is a vector of n parameters. Zi and Zt can be subsets of {Xit}, or can consist of 
composite variables based on {Xit}, depending on the nature of the specific choice 
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situation. In any case we expect that m < < IT and n < < IT. Thus the total number 
of parameters is greatly reduced. Note that equation (1.13) and (1.14) satisfy the 
condition that all {Bit} are positive. 
The estimation of the heteroscedastic models (1.9) or (1.10) can be carried out 
using the maximum likelihood method. Suppose we have a random sample with 
observations (Cit, X it), where Cit = 1 if individual t chooses alternative i, and Cit = 0 
otherwise. The log-likelihood of observation t is: 
I 
l(ct,Xt,O) = Lcidnpit, 
i=l 
where 0 is the vector of all unknown parameters of Pit: 
0 = (.8', a~, a~,¢>')', (1.15) 
where cf> is the vector of possible parameters in G. In the case of the nested logit 
model (1.6), for example, c/> = ( u1, ... , u J )'. 
The sample log-likelihood is: 
T 
L(O) = 2.:: l(Ct, Xt, 0). 
t=l 
The maximum likelihood estimators are obtained by solving 8L(O)f80i = 0 using 
standard numerical maximization methods. McFadden(1984) provides a set of 
regularity conditions under which MLE of probability choice yields consistency 
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and asymptotic normality. Of these conditions the most important one is that Pit be 
continuous and differentiable in the unknown parameters 0. Our generalization of 
the GEV class preserves this condition. 
Hypothesis Testing 
All econometric models are subject to potential specification errors which can 
damage the desired properties of the estimators. Models that are estimated by 
the maximum likelihood method are particularly sensitive to specification errors. 
Hence it is very important to develop specification tests to check the validity of the 
model assumptions. We now discuss a test for the presence of heteroscedastidty. 
The test can help us to decide whether the heteroscedastic models should be used 
instead of the standard, homoscedastic models. As the homoscedastic models 
are parametric special cases of the heteroscedastic models, LM tests can be easily 
constructed. 
From (1.13) and (1.14) we see that when a 1 = 0, ()it = Ot. That is, there is no 
heteroscedasticity across alternatives. When a2 = 0, then ()it = Oi, that is, there is no 
heteroscedasticity across individuals. Finally, when a1 = a2 = 0, then the model is 
homoscedastic. Therefore, we can test the presence of heteroscedasticity by testing 
the values of the a's. Write () in (1.15) as ( ()~, 02)', where Ot = a1 for the purpose of 
testing a1 = 0; 61 = a2 for testing a2 = 0; and 61 = (a~, a2)' for testing a1 = a2 = 0. 
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Then we want to test the null hypothesis 
Ho: fh = 0 
Let if= (0' , fi2)', where ifz is the MLE of () 2 under the null hypothesis. Denote 
(1.16) 
which follows a limiting x2 distribution with degree of freedom equal to the number 
of constraints. In (1.16) the tilde means "evaluated at if." 
1.4 A Heteroscedastic Logit Model 
This section focuses on the heteroscedastic logit model, a special case of the het-
eroscedastic GEV class which is potentially useful in many applications. We discuss 
the specification, estimation, hypothesis testing, and properties of the choice proba-
bill ties of the model. We also briefly discuss the heteroscedastic nested logit model, 
which is closely related to the heteroscedastic logit model. 
A Heteroscedastic Logit Model 
6See Engle (1984). 
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Consider the case G(Yi, . . . , Y1) = "L[=1 Yi (the generating function for the multi-
nomiallogit model). We have G; = 1 Vi, and model (1.9) becomes: 
(1.17) 
This is a heteroscedastic logit model with heteroscedasticity across population as 
well as across alternatives. Note that this model need not exhibit the IIA property. 
If ()it = Ot, then from equation (1.10) we have: 
I 
Pit = ev;r6r I L ev;r6r . (1.18) 
j=l 
This is a heteroscedastic logit model with heteroscedasticity across population 
only. This model is very attractive because of the simplicity of the probability 
expressions. The probabilities are similar to the standard logit probabilities, except 
that the deterministic part of the utility functions, the vit's, are weighted by 0/s that 
are inversely related to the standard error of the error terms. Intuitively this means 
that more weight is given to the utility functions of those individuals with smaller 
variances of the error terms. In the following discussions we focus on this model. 
It can be easily verified, however, that model (1.18) is subject to the ITA property. 
If ()it = 1, Vi, Vt, then (1.18) reduce to the standard logit model, which is subject 
to the ITA restriction as well as homoscedasticity of the disturbances. 
If I = 2 and Otis parameterized as 1/exp(ztfh), then model (1.18) is the spec-
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ification used by Davidson and Mackinnon (1984) in developing the LM test for 
heteroscedasticity in the probit and the standard logit model. Therefore, as men-
tioned in Section 2, it is a mistake to say that the specification "cannot be properly 
called a specification of heteroscedasticity" and the LM test "is not well suited to 
the logit model." 
Estimation 
To estimate model (1.18), parameterize Ot as (fot example): Ot = e"'z,, where Zt 
is a vector of n attributes that vary with t. Then, 
I I 
lnpit {3' a
1z 1 z= {J'x · e0 zr - Xite '- n e •• 
j=l 
I 
8lnpit/8f3 - XitOt - 2: X jtBtPjt 
i=l 
I 
O(xit- Xt), where Xt = 2: X jtPjt 
j=l 
I 
8lnpitf8a - {31Xit0tZt- 2: /31Xjt0tZtPjt 
j=l 
- Otztf3' (X it - Xt). 
The log likelihood is L = Lt Li Cit In Pit· Therefore the MLE estimators are obtained 
by solving: 
8Lj8{3 - 2:2: Citea'z'(Xit- Xt) = 0 and 
t 




1.4. A HEl'EROSCEDASTIC LOGIT MODEL 29 
Hypothesis Testing 
To test the presence of heteroscedasticity, i.e., to test a' = 0, we derive the test 
statistic from the general formula (1.16). From (1.19) and (1.20), we have: 




V,ea = EL,eL~ L LPit(}~f3'(xit- Xt){Xit- Xt) z;. 
t 
Evaluating these expressions and the partial derivatives of L at a = 0, f3 = 'fi and 
Pit =Pit estimated from the homoscedastic model (i.e., the standard logit model), 
we get 
L,e L L Cit(Xit- Xt) 
t i 
La - EL:CitZt'fi'(Xit- Xt) 
t i 
V.a.a LLPit(Xit- Xt){Xit- xt)' 
t i 
Vaa L L Pit[P'(Xit- Xt)] 2ztz; 
t i 
Va,B - L L PitP'(Xit - Xt)Zt(Xit - Xt)' and 
t • 
V,Ba - LLPitP'(xit- Xt)(xit- Xt)z;. 
t i 
Substituting these values into equation (1.16) (with Ot =a and (}2 = {3), we obtain 
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the LM test statistic for presence of heteroscedastidty of the multinomial logit 
model, with model (1.18) as the alternative heteroscedastic model. Furthermore, 
the test statistic ~LM has the same expression if we parameterize Bt as (1 + a'zt) 2. 
We conjecture that this will be the case for any parameterization h( a' zt ) of Bt such 
that his second order continuous and h(O) = 1. 
Note that if we parameterize Bt as a linear (in parameters) function of observable 
variables (provided that Bt > 0 is guaranteed), then the parameters in ()t cannot be 
identified from f3. The estimation of the heteroscedastic logit model can then be 
easily carried out using a standard logit package after properly transforming the 
independent variables. 
Other interesting tests for the heteroscedastic logit model include the test of the 
IIA property of model (1.18). There is a rich literature on testing the IIA assumption 
for the standard multinomial logit model (e.g., Housman and McFadden 1984; 
McFadden 1987; McFadden, Train and Tye 1976; Small and Hsiao 1985; and Wills 
1987). We expect that with some appropriate adjustment, results from this research 
can be readily applied to the heteroscedastic model. 
Derivatives and elasticities of choice probabilities 
One purpose of estimating a choice model is to know how the choice probabili-
ties change in response to a change in some observed variables, or how an observed 
factor affects the probabilities of choosing each alternative. For this purpose the 
derivatives and/ or elasticities of the choice probabilities need to be derived. Unlike 
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linear models in which the derivatives of the dependent variable with respect to 
the independent variables are directly observable from the estimated coefficients, 
most probability choice models are non-linear models and the expressions for the 
derivatives/ elasticities can be quite complicated. We now derive the derivatives 
and elasticities of the choice probabilities for our heteroscedastic logit model. 
Assume the deterministic utility functions v i are linear in parameters? that is, 
M N 
Vi= L f3mx~ + L /~Yn , (1.21) 
m=l n=l 
where x denotes alternative-specific variables and y denotes individual-specific 
variables. In studying how consumers choose from different types of automobiles, 
for example, x might include such variables as the price of each type and the 
gas-efficiency of each type, with xi indicating the corresponding price or gas-
efficiency of type i automobile; and y might include the buyer's income, which 
affect different v/s by having different coefficients. The probability expressions of 
the heteroscedastic legit model are as in (1.18). Then, 
(1.22) 
It can be verified that 
8pi aov . = Pi(Dt -Pi), 
J 
(1.23) 
7Hereafter we drop the subscript t in Vit for notational simplicity. 
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where D1 = 1 if j = i, and D1 = 0 otherwise. From (1.21), we have 
(1.24) 
where D2 = 1 if j = s, and D2 = 0 otherwise. Combining (1.23) and (1.24), we have 
ae 
~p;(DI- PiHaxk vi+ Dz{hO] 
ae 
pi[axsk L(D1- Pi)vi + Of3k 2;: D2 (D1 - Pi)] 
J J 
ae 
- pi[-a s (vi- LPivi) + Of3k(D- Ps)], (1.25) 
xk j 
where D = 1 if s = i, and D = 0 otherwise. 
Next we derive S!.E.i..8
8 · in a similar fashion. We have 
Ylc 
We already know that 
where D 1 = 1 if j = i, and D1 = 0 otherwise. From (121), we also know that 
aev . ae av . ao . 
-a J = -a Vj + a J o = -a Vj +fiB. 
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Combining (1.27) and (1.28), we have 
(1.29) 
The elasticities of choice probabilities can be easily obtained from the derivatives 
(1.25) and (1.29): 
(1.30) 
(1.31) 
When() = 1, and therefore 888• = 888 = 0, (1.25) and (1.29) become the deriva-xk Yk 










and (1.30) and (1.31) become the elasticities of the standard logit choice probabilities: 
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A Heteroscedastic Nested Logit Model 
We have seen that the heteroscedastic logit model is a special case of the het-
eroscedastic GEV model when G(Y1, ... , Y[) = L::{=1 }i. Another special case of the 
heteroscedastic GEV model is the heteroscedastic nested logit model, resulted from 
taking the G function to be8 
(1.36) 
Substituting this G function and its partial derivatives into model (1.10), we can 
derive the choice probabilities of a nested logit model with heteroscedasticity across 
individuals: 
ellv1 
(1.37) Pl eiiVJ + ( ellt12/u + ellv3/u)u 
P(2,3) 
( e/lt12/<7 + e/IV'JfUV 
(1.38) -
eiiVJ + ( ellt12/u + eiiV'J/u )u 
ellvj/<7 
(1.39) Pil(2,3) - ellt12/u + eiiV'J/u. 
Define the inclusive value I as 
(1.40) 
8For notational simplicity, we consider the G function for a three alternative, two-level-tree 
nested logit model, with the second and the thiid alternative being the "similar" ones (see, for 
example, Maddala 1983 for a discussion of the nested logit model). The results here can be readily 
generalized to cases with more alternatives and higher level tree structures. 
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Then we can rewrite (1.37) and (1.38) as 
e6v1 
Pt 
e6VJ + euJ (1.41) 
eu l 
P(2,3) e6VJ + eu[ • (1.42) 
Careful examination of (1.39),(1.40),(1.41), and (1.42) shows that, similar to 
the standard nested logit model, the heteroscedastic nested logit model can be 
estimated sequentially (with some loss of efficiency). We can first estimate the 
coefficients in v2, v3 and () from the conditional choice model (1.39), which is a 
heteroscedastic logit model.9 We then calculate the inclusive value I by (1.40). 
Finally, parameters in v1 and a can be estimated from (1.41) and (1.42), which 
are probabilities of a standard logit model. The reason why (1.41) and (1.42) are 
standard logit probabilities is as follows: if the parameters in () can be identified 
from those in v (e.g., when() is parameterized as eaz), then they can be estimated in 
the first stage, and in the second stage () is like an observed independent variable 
that can be easily incorporated into v1; if the parameters in() cannot be identified 
from those in v (e.g., when() is parameterized as az), then model (1.41) and (1.42) 
can be eStimated by a standard logit package after proper transformation of the 
independent variables. 
The nested logit model avoids the ITA restriction of the standard logit model, the 
heteroscedastic nested logit model further relaxes the assumption of homoscedastic 
9Note that u cannot be identified from the coefficients in v2 and v3. 
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errors in the nested logit model, and therefore achieves great functional flexibility. 
Its estimation can be carried out either with a full information maximum likelihood 
procedure, or, at some cost of efficiency, by the sequential procedure outlined 
above. Because of the functional similarity between a standard nested logit model 
and the heteroscedastic one, we expect that many results relevant to the standard 
nested logit model can be easily extended to the heteroscedastic model. Examples 
include results on correcting the errors in the covariance matrix estimated at the 
second stage of the sequential estimating procedure (Amemiya 1978) and results 
on specification tests of the nested logit model (e.g., Horowitz 1987). 
1.5 Conclusions 
This chapter relaxes the homoscedastidty restriction of the GEV models. There-
sulting heteroscedastic models preserve the computational ease of the GEV family, 
and allow general patterns of covariance structure of the disturbances. The het-
eroscedastic GEV model is nearly as flexible as the probit model, but has great 
advantage over the latter because it can handle problems with a large number of 
alternatives, while the probit model is computationally infeasible when there are 
more than a few alternatives. Of particular practical interest are the heteroscedastic 
logit and nested logit models. Both models have simple expressions for the choice 
probabilities that are similar to their standard counterparts. Estimation of these 
new models are implementable with standard maximum likelihood technique and 
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straightforward tests have been developed to check for violations of the standard 
maintained hypothesis of homoscedasticity across alternatives and individuals in 
the GEV family. An empirical application of the heteroscedastic logit model can 
be found in Chapter 2 that demonstrates the practical value of the model. Future 
research can extend many interesting results on specification tests for the standard 
logit/nested logit models to the heteroscedastic ones, and can further explore the 
empirical validity of the various heteroscedastic models. 
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Chapter 2 
Rational Voter Models 
2.1 Introduction 
Voting behavior in mass elections is one of the most thoroughly studied subjects in 
political science because it has important consequences for the operation of demo-
cratic systems. An important class of voting models which assume voters to be 
"rational" in making their voting decisions are the so-called rational voter models. 
An advantage of these models is that they provide explicit, precise theoretical bases 
for voting decisions and their analysis, and lead to testable hypotheses about voting 
behavior. They have therefore received much attention in the literature and have 
become quite popular. Two major models proposed in this tradition are (1) the 
expected utility maximization model or the Downsian model (Downs 1957; Riker 
and Ordeshook 1968; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1972), which states that voting is 
(partly) an investment decision and that voters choose the actions which give them 
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greater expected benefits involving the P B terms;1 and (2) the "minmax regret" 
model (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) which posits that voters choose their actions so 
as to minimize their maximum regrets. 2 For the voting turnout decision, the first 
model implies, operationally, that the interaction of the closeness of the race and 
the utility difference terms matter in the voting decision (in addition to the fixed 
benefit and cost terms), while in the second model, only the utility difference terms 
matter. For the candidate choice decision, the Downsian model permits strategic 
voting, while according to the minmax regret model voters should always vote for 
the top preference. These models have invoked an intense debate among political 
scientists holding different views on the interpretation and modelling of rational 
behavior, and many attempts to test them empirically can be found in the literature 
(see, for example, Rosenthal and Sen 1973; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975; Ashenfelter 
and Kelly 1975; Black 1978; Foster 1984; Hansen, Palfrey and Rosenthal1987). 
Despite all the research that has been done in this area, however, many impor-
tant issues remain controversial, or ambiguous, or largely unexamined. Among 
them are some theoretical and methodological issues concerning the specification 
and comparative study of various rational voter models for the turnout decision, 
the formal testing of strategic voting behavior implied by the Downsian model for 
1 P is the probability that by casting the vote the voter can make a difference in the election 
outcome, and B is the utility gain (loss) the voter receives if he makes a difference. 
2Here "regret" is defined as the voter's utility loss resulting from taking an action that may not 
be optimal given the "true" state of the world, which is unknown to the voter. The loss may be 
different under different "true state" of the world, and the voter is supposed to choose an action 
such that the maximum regret associated with this action is the minimum among all actions. 
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the candidate choice decision in the presence of a minor party candidate, and the 
methodological treatment of voter heterogeneity. These issues are explored in the 
current study. 
Concerning the specification and comparative study of the turnout models, 
there are two problems in the previous research. First, although the Downsian 
model clearly specifies the expected utility maximization rule, it is often taken to 
mean a model in which "closeness matters" and just that. Hence, it is not unusual 
that, in testing the Downsian model, scholars focus only on the effect of closeness 
of the race, that is, the P terms, rather than on the interaction of the closeness of 
the race and the utility differences, that is, the P B terms ( e.g., Ashenfelter and 
Kelly 1975; Black 1978). However, as we discuss in the next section, a model in 
which P but not P B matters is no longer an expected utility maximization model. 
Rather, it is a distinct model based on utility maximization which involves no risk. 3 
To claim empirical support for the Downsian model based on the significance of 
the P terms only is therefore not justified. That the two models are different can 
be further shown by demonstrating empirically that the significance of the P term 
does not imply that of the P B term, and vice versa. Indeed, analysis of the 1968 
and 1980 data will show that, for the turnout decision, it is the P terms, but not 
the P B terms, that significantly enter the calculus, while for the candidate choice 
decision, the opposite is true. 
3We hereafter refer this model as the "closeness model" or the II P model" for convenience. 
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Second, previous researchers ignore data problems such as multicollinearity. 4 
Although different rational voter models reflect different hypotheses about deci-
sionmaking, the variables specified by these models may be closely correlated by 
construction. For instance, the P B term of the Downsian model is constructed as 
the product of P of the closeness model and B of the minmax regret model. Hence 
multicollinearity is likely to be present if the models are compared by including all 
variables in the same equation. When multicollinearity exists, desirable properties 
of estimators obtained by standard procedures are damaged and inferences based 
on such estimators are unreliable and misleading. It is nevertheless a common 
practice to test different theories by including all the possible variables in one gen-
eral equation, and testing for the significance of coefficients (e.g., Ashenfelter and 
Kelly 1975; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975). 5 Because of this, and because the problem 
of multicollinearity in the logit model is far less studied than in the linear regression 
model, we feel it is useful to discuss the problem and related techniques in some 
detail in this essay. We will show through formal tests that severe problems of 
multicollinearity do occur in, for example, Ferejohn and Fiorina's (1975) analysis, 
and therefore conclusions based on standard estimators are questionable. We then 
briefly discuss several alternative estimators such as Stein, ridge, and principle 
component estimators for the logit model. As these estimators are biased and their 
4Foster (1984) is an exception, discussing the problem in the context of the linear model. 
50ne reason for doing so, according to Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), is that to compare models 
involving different variables by estimating them separately would require non-nested hypothesis 
testing techniques, which are not as well-developed and as familiar to many as nested hypothesis 
testing. We will tum to this problem later. 
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statistical properties are ambiguous, we do not base our inferences about model 
comparison on them. Rather, we estimate different models separately and apply 
non-nested hypothesis testing to compare their performance. The results show that 
neither the Downsian nor the minmax regret model predict voting turnout well, 
while the closeness model is a slight improvement over the two standard ones. 
In studying the performance of rational voter models for the candidate choice 
decision, we show that unlike turnout, expected utility terms as specified in the 
Downsian model do significantly affect vote choice. We believe this difference 
between the turnout and the vote calculation reflects the distinct nature of the two 
decisions. The results also provide dear evidence of strategic voting in the pres-
ence of a third candidate. Strategic voting in three-candidate races that avoids the 
"wasted vote" and causes a third party "squeeze" has been discussed theoretically 
(Duverger 1967; Downs 1957; Farquharson 1969; Myerson and Weber 1988; Palfrey 
1989) and tested both empirically (Black 1978; Cain 1978; Laver 1987) and in lab-
oratory experiments (Plott 1991). In the U.S., two presidential elections in recent 
history involve a prominent third candidate-the 1968 and the 1980 presidential 
elections. Although some evidence of strategic voting behavior in these elections 
exists (I<iewiet 1979; Abramson et al. 1982), no formal estimate of the relationship 
between candidate viability and strategically rational voting is offered. Our re-
sults show that strategic voting does occur as theory predicts. Furthermore, we 
show that strategic considerations affect voters favoring the minor party candidate 
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much more significantly than major party voters. For the latter, the vote decision 
is determined largely by such variables as partisanship and candidate evaluations. 
We lastly address the issue of voter heterogeneity. Heterogeneity means, 
roughly, differences. Voters differ from one another in various aspects. Some 
of these differences are observable and measurable, as captured by the values of 
various explanatory variables. However, there may exist other types of differences 
beyond this. One example is that the error terms of the utility functions, which 
include the summary effects of all excluded relevant variables, may have differ-
ent variances (heteroscedasticity) because their effects on voting behavior may 
be different in nature and magnitude across voters. Another example is that the 
measured attributes included in the model may affect different voters in different 
ways, leading to varying coefficients across voters. 6 When heterogeneity exists, 
standard models such as simple logit are not strictly appropriate. In this study 
we concentrate on heteroscedasticity. Specifically, we are interested in testing the 
notion of "effective rationality" (Goldberger 1969; Black 1978) which embodies the 
idea that even though all individuals may try to act rationally, they may not be able 
to avoid errors in their calculations and they may differ in the accuracy of their 
calculations. One source of this variation is voter information (Black 1978; Palfrey 
6This type of heterogeneity is discussed in more detail in Rivers (1988), where a varying co-
efficients logit model using rank-ordered data is proposed as a solution. A crucial limitation of 
this model is that the number of unknown parameters increases with sample size N, and hence 
the maximum likelihood estimation is not consistent. The random coefficient models, assuming 
coefficients are drawn from a certain distribution, can avoid this "infinite parameter" problem. See, 
for example, Manski and McFadden 1981. 
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and Poole 1987). Operationally this translates to heteroscedasticity and renders 
the widely used standard logit model inappropriate. Therefore the application of 
a heteroscedastic logit model developed in Chapter 1 is explored as an alternative. 
We demonstrate that the heteroscedastic logit model can be easily applied, and 
its estimation can often be carried out using the standard logit procedure. The 
new model is shown to significantly outperform the standard logit. Findings from 
the data support the notion of effective rationality, and reveal strong effects of 
information on the turnout decision. 
In what follows, Section 2 discusses the specification of rational turnout models, 
and presents empirical findings on the comparative merits of these models; Section 
3 focuses on strategic voting behavior; Section 4 concerns the methodological treat-
ment of voter heterogeneity; and Section 5 offers concluding remarks. Technical 
details on some methodological topics are contained in the appendix. Note that 
the 1980 election data are validated, but the 1968 data are not. Hence more weight 
should be placed on results from the 1980 data. 
2.2 Rational Voter Models: Comparative Studies 
Two major rational choice models have been proposed to explain voting turnout 
behavior: the expected utility maximization model and the minmax regret model. 
The original version of the expected utility model (Downs 1957) views voting as a 
pure investment decision: a voter compares the costs of voting in the present with 
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the expected utility gain in the future and votes if the expected benefit exceeds costs. 
The net return of voting can be expressed as: 
R= PB- C, (2.1) 
where Pis the probability that by voting the voter can make a (favorable) difference 
on the election outcome. This probability is positively related to the closeness of the 
race between the candidates. B is the benefit the voter receives from this difference, 
and C is the cost of voting. Assuming that C > 0, this model fails to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of turnout in mass elections because the probability that 
a single vote can make a difference on the election outcome is practically zero 
and hence the P B term is infinitesimal. So it is irrational for voters with any 
significantly positive voting cost to turn out (Ledyard 1984; Palfrey and Rosenthal 
1985). 
Bothered by this feature of the Downsian model and observing that Downs does 
not include "non-political" benefits of voting appeared important in empirical in-
vestigations, Riker and Ordeshook (1%8) introduced aD term into the calculus, 
which registers sources of positive satisfaction with voting such as the compli-
ance with the ethic of voting ("citizen duty") . Because the benefits in D can be 
substantial, it may therefore be rational for people to vote. Equation (2.1) thus 
becomes: 
R=PB+D-C (2.2) 
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which is generalized for multicandidate elections by McKelvey and Ordeshook 
(1972) to 
(2.3) 
assuming only two-way ties are likely. In (2.3), Ek - E 0 is the expected utility 
difference between voting for candidate k and abstaining, and the BP terms on the 
right hand side represent pairwise comparisons between candidate k and the other 
candidates. 
Assuming that the probability terms are unknown or unknowable, Ferejolm 
and Fiorina (1974) consider an alternative decision rule, namely the minmax regret 
decision rule, which specifies that the voter should choose the act that minimizes 
his maximum regret. They show that in this model only the B terms enter the 
calculation of the turnout decision 
For the expected utility maximization model, the empirical significance of the 
D term seems well established (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Katosh and Traugott 
1982; and Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975). However, the importance of the P B term is 
questionable. We are not aware of any strong empirical support for the significance 
of the P B term in turnout decisions in mass elections, although there are a number 
of studies that find that "closeness matters," i.e., closeness alone as an independent 
variable matters (c.f., Cohen and Uhlaner 1991; Foster 1984; Palfrey and Rosenthal 
1987; Rosenthal and Sen 1973). But does the fact that "closeness matters" establish 
empirical support for the Downsian model? In other words, is "closeness matters" 
52 GIAPTER 2. RATIONAL VOTER MODELS 
equivalent to "expected utility terms matter"? If not, what do these empirical 
findings suggest? 
Closeness Matters. So? To answer the above questions, let us recall that "ex-
pected utility" refers to the utility derived from possible future benefits (and/ or 
costs), or more accurately, utility over lotteries (c.f., Varian 1984). Roughly speaking, 
to maximize expected utility means to choose the action that generates the greatest 
future net benefits discounted by the probabilities that these benefits will be realized. 
Note that the main body of the object of maximization is benefits and costs, and 
that probabilities of the states of the world only serve as discount factors, which 
generate no utility on their own. Voters get no direct utility from breaking ties, but 
only from the benefits they receive when their candidate wins and poses programs 
they favor. Hence, to show that voters are maximizing expected utility, we need 
to show that the discounted future benefits (i.e., P B) matter, not that the discount 
factor (P) itself matters. P does not constitute an expected utility term, and if it 
is significant in its own sake, it must be that it is playing a different role than a 
probability discount factor, and bears its own substantive meanings. Therefore, if 
P B does not enter the calculus significantly, then the voter is no longer maximizing 
expected utility, even if "closeness matters." 
Note that if P enters the model as an independent variable that bears its own 
substantive meaning (we discuss the meaning later), but P B does not, then the 
decision no longer involves any risk; and all benefits and costs come with certainty, 
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without any discounts. In this situation, a voter's decision involves no investment 
elements, in the sense that we cannot infer that he or she is looking to future outcomes. 
And therefore, he is an utility maximizer, not an expected utility maximizer. That" P 
matters" and "P B matters" are different things can also be justified empirically by 
showing that the significance of P does not imply the significance of P B, and vice 
versa. Such findings are indeed reported in Rosenthal and Sen (1973) in studying 
the "heuristic model" of the Downsian specification. Our own empirical results 
shall provide another piece of evidence. 
So previous research which concludes that "closeness matters" but P B does 
not actually provides empirical support not for the Downsian model, but for an-
other distinct rational voter model, a pure consumption model based on utility 
maximization. Let us formulate this model as:7 
R = J(P) +D-C (2.4) 
or, for multi-candidate competitions, 
R = f ( P;i, 'Vi =/: j) + D - C (2.5) 
where f is some (possibly increasing) function which is specified as linear in our 
7We can also write the model as R = D 1 - C, because P generates consumption value, just as D 
does. 
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empirical study for simplicity.8 
As for the substantive meaning of Pin (2.4) or (2.5), Rosenthal and Sen (1973) 
hypothesize that the level of the competition is positively correlated with a voter's 
interest in a campaign, which in turn stimulates turnout. We conjecture that close-
ness of the race is also positively related to a voter's feeling of efficacy when voting. 
Note that compared with its role in expected utility considerations, the closeness of 
the race need not be very high to stimulate interest or to introduce efficacy. In Fere-
john and Fiorina's language, "for expected utility maximization the probability ... is 
very important," whereas as a stimulating source, "the mere logical possibility 
of such an event (that an individual has any impact) is enough." (Ferejohn and 
Fiorina 1975). 
Now we have three different voting turnout models, and one way to compare 
them empirically is to include the variables specified by each model into one 
general equation, and see which of them are significant, and which are not. This 
is the method employed by several researchers (e.g., Ashenfelter and Kelly 1975; 
Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975). In doing so, however, we encounter a serious problem 
with multicollinearity. Hence a discussion of the problem of multicollinearity is in 
order. 
8Note that theoretically the Downsian model and the P model do not exclude each other, for 
closeness may both generate utility itself and serve as a proxy of probability factor. Hence we may 
include the P terms into the Downsian framework and write: 
E"- Ffl = B~:1P1:1 + B~:2P1:2 + ... + f(P,j, Vi# j) +D-C 
where f( P1j, Vi # j) can be regarded much as another D term. 
(2.6) 
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Data Problem: Multicollinearity Multicollinearity arises when two or more in-
dependent variables or combinations of variables are highly but not perfectly cor-
related. For the linear regression model, the effects, diagnosis, and remedy of this 
problem are thoroughly studied (see, for example, Judge et al. 1985). Although 
little work has been done for non-linear models in general, recent advances in the 
statistics literature do offer information about the binary logit model (e.g., Marx 
and Smith 1990; Schaefer 1986; Schaefer, Roi and Wolfe 1984), which is the most 
widely used model in voting studies. The effect of multicollinearity in the logit 
model is found to be similar to that in the linear regression. Namely, it causes 
extreme sensitivity of parameters to small perturbations in the explanatory vari-
ables, extremely large variances of coefficients and predictions, and bad properties 
of statistical testing on parameters. Because of this, diagnosis of the problem where 
it is likely to be present is necessary, and action should be taken accordingly. 
Diagnosis Some useful diagnostic tests are offered by Marx and Smith (1990), 
which should be consulted for technical details. Here we briefly discuss the ideas 
behind the tests. Note that the covariance matrix of the coefficients estimated by the 
maximum likelihood procedure is approximated by the inverse of the (estimated) 
information matrix, hence the properties of the information matrix will directly 
affect that of the estimators. If it is ill-conditioned, i.e., if it is near singular, or its 
square root has nearly linearly dependent columns, 9 then the undesirable proper-
9The square root of a matrix A is a matrix D such that D' D = A. 
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ties discussed above would be present. Denote the estimated information matrix 
by F, and its square root by S. DenoteS* the scaled S such that its columns have 
unit length, and denote F* = s•' S*. Then, diagnosis of ill-conditioning of F can be 
based on the following: 
1. The correlations between columns of S: high correlations indicate ill-conditioning 
of F. The correlation matrix is given by F*. 
2. The variance inflation measures: diagonal elements of the inverse ofF • give a 
measure of inflation of the asymptotic variances of the estimated parameters. 
These measures are 1 when the columns of S are perfectly orthogonal (ideal 
condition). 
3. The condition numbers of F*: defined as the square root of the ratio of the 
largest eigenvalue of F* over the others, indicate ill-conditioning of F if any 
of them is "large."10 
4. Variance proportion: each eigenvalue of F* contributes to the variance of 
the estimated coefficients. If the proportion of the variance of a coefficient 
attributed to a small eigenvalue (associated with a large condition number) 
is big (say, exceeds 50 percent), that coefficient is likely affected by multi-
collinearity, and its value is unreliable. 
10Utere is no strict criteria as how large is '1arge." Johnston (1984) sets the critical value to 20, 
Marx and Smith to 30. Our own experience suggests that caution should be applied when any 
conditional number exceeds, say, 10. 
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To show that the problem of multicollinearity may exist when the rational voting 
turnout models are compared by including all variables in the same equation, we 
apply the above tests to the following model, in which the P B, B, and P terms and 
some D and C terms are all included. Specifically, the model is: 
logit(p[vote]) - {Canst., P B12 , P B13, P B23, P12, P13, P23, B12, B13, 
U1, Info., Educ., Party}* (3. (2.7) 
In the above model, 11 logit specifies the logit operation (a logit model is used 
given the discrete nature of the dependent variable), p[vote] is the probability of 
voting turnout, C onst. is a constant term, P;i and B;i denote the closeness of the race 
and utility difference between the respondents' ith and the jth ranked preference 12 
respectively, P B;i = P;i * B;i, U1 is the utility for the first preference, 13 Info. is an 
index of voter information (Palfrey and Poole 1987), Educ. education level, and 
Party party strength. The last four variables are included as proxies of the D or C 
term.14 Lacking a cardinal subjective probability index in our data set, the actual 
11 Note that the multi-candidate models are used here because we have three candidates for both 
1968 and 1980 elections. As the three B terms are perfectly collinear (B13 = B12 + B23), only two of 
them are included. It does not matter which two are included. The third provides no information. 
12Preference orderings are obtained from the thermometer scores, with ties broken by party 
scores. 
13U1 is included to test the alienation hypothesis (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). The prediction 
is that the higher U1, the more likely individuals will vote, as they feel more positive about the 
alternatives they face. 
14Note that information may reflect voting costs. Other C category variables, like registration 
laws, are not included because of lack of data. 
58 GIAPTER 2. RATIONAL VOTER MODELS 
vote return in the respondent's state is used to construct the closeness terms.15 
Following Myerson and Weber (1988), we operationalize the probability of a tie 
between the Ph and the kth preference as: Pjk = vi* vk, where vi denotes the vote 
percentage received by the voter's Ph preference which is positively related to the 
marginal probability that his jth preference is in first place. 
The first sign of multicollinearity in this model is a dramatic change in the 
estimated parameters if some terms are dropped from the full model. For example, 
in estimating the 1968 sample, the full model estimates show that the P B terms are 
significant. However, if the P and B terms are dropped, then P B is no longer so. 
Formal test results of the problem are reported in Table 1.1, under "modell." We 
see that for both the 1968 and the 1980 data, severe multicollinearity exists, with the 
estimates of the coefficients for P terms and for some of the P B and B terms most 
likely to be affected. The estimates of the P terms are especially unreliable, given 
that more than 90% of their variances are attributed to the smallest eigenvalue 
(associated with the least important eigenvector), and that these variances are 
highly inflated. For both years, the maximum correlation coefficients are well 
above 0.5, and the conditional numbers are close to 20. Hence, it is very misleading 
if the data problem is ignored and comparison of the models is solely based on the 
15-Jbe use of the state level data is based on two considerations. Ftrst, it is more legitimate under 
the electoral college system (see, e.g., Kiewiet 1979). We tried the national data and found them 
insignificant, which we interpret as evidence of the impact of the electoral college system. Second, 
as reported by Field (1981), "the amount of 1980 polling conducted at the state level was more 
extensive than ever before in a presidential election," and closely matched the actual vote return 
patterns. This means, of course, that the actual return data is close to the state poll data and, 
therefore, that actual returns can be used to construct the subjective probability terms. 
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maximum likelihood estimates of model (2.7). 
Next we are curious to see whether the problem would exist for a simple model 
such as the one specified in Ferejohn and Fiorina (1975), where only the constant, 
one P Band one B term are included (here we include P B12 and B12 ). The test 
results are shown in Table 2.1 under "model2." The data are striking, especially for 
the year 1980. The condition number of the information matrix is as high as 83; the 
variances of the estimated coefficients are extremely inflated and are almost solely 
attributed to the smallest eigenvalue. Hence, the estimation of the model does not 
provide any information, and it is wholly inappropriate to draw any conclusion 
from such estimates. 
It is clear, then, that we cannot base the comparison of the rational voter mod-
els on the MLE of model (2.7). We have two alternatives. First, we can derive 
alternative estimators for model (2.7). Second, we can estimate the various models 
separately, and perform non-nested hypotheses testing. 
Alternative estimators Some alternative estimators, namely ridge, principle 
components and Stein estimators are proposed when multicollinearity is present 
(e.g., Schaefer 1986; Schaefer, Roi and Wolfe 1984). 16 These estimators are aimed 
at improving the precision of the MLE estimates by adjusting the MLE in certain 
ways. Denote by f3mlu /3pc' f3s, and f3r the MLE, principle component, Stein, and 
16-fhese estimators are similar to their counterparts in the linear regression model, only that the 
focus of the operations is the information matrix rather than the matrix X' X (assuming X is the 
matrix of independent variables). 
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ridge estimators, respectively, and recall that F is the estimated information matrix. 
Then: 
~ + ~ 
F Ff3mle 
cf3mte 
where ft'+ is the generalized inverse of F, i.e., the inverse ofF with its "minor" 
component deleted (its small eigenvalues zeroed); c the Stein shrinkage parameter, 
chosen to minimize the mean square error; k is the ridge parameter, 17 and I the 
identity matrix. The idea behind the principle component estimator is that when 
multicollinearity exists, some of the components ofF (those associated with small 
eigenvalues) supply little information but contribute much to the variance of the 
estimates, hence deleting them should reduce the variance of parameter estimates 
without losing much information. The Stein estimator is obtained by shrinking 
both the MLE parameters and their variances by the same factor, which is chosen 
to minimize the mean squared error of the Stein estimator. The ridge estimator 
works by altering the data to counteract near singularity (c.f., Johnston 1984), while 
in a Bayesian interpretation, it implicitly incorporates information from outside the 
sample (Chow 1983). 
17The choice of k is subjective. Schaefer suggests the use ofk = K I (!3',.. 1• f3mle ), where K is number 
of parameters in the model. We use this formula here. 
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Coefficient estimates from the three alternative estimators, together with the 
original maximum likelihood estimates, are presented in Table 2.2-1 (1968) and 
Table 2.2-2 (1980). Also reported are the standard errors of the estimates and the 
t-statistics.18 For the Stein estimator, only the shrinkage parameters are reported, 
because the coefficients and their standard errors are simply the MLE weighted by 
this parameter, and the "t-statistic" is the same as that of the MLE. 
Note that all these alternative estimators shrink the variance ofMLE, and hence 
are more "precise." The differences between the MLE and the ridge and principle 
components estimators mainly show up in the P B, P or B terms that are most 
affected by multicollinearity. This proves that these alternative estimators at least 
hit the problem. In this regard, the Stein estimator is the least satisfactory. Also, 
the ridge and principle components estimators in general have smaller variances 
than the Stein estimator. Hence, we do not recommend the Stein estimator. 19 In 
terms of fitting (log likelihood), the PC estimators are the worst, intuitively because 
they work as if by deleting variables, and hence is using less information from the 
data.20 In terms of mean squared error, however, all four estimators are about the 
same: for the 1968 data, all of them generate the same MSE of 0.29; while for the 
1980 data, the MLE, Stein and ridge have a MSE of 0.21, and the PC estimator, 0.22. 
Although the alternative estimators all have a smaller variance than the stan-
1&rhe t statistics for the alternative estimators are only heuristic and serve as a rough reference, 
as the statistical distribution of these estimators are actually unknown. 
19Marx and Smith (1990) give similar recommendations. 
2.0-fhe MLE, of course, gives the best log likelihood because it is obtained by maximizing the 
likelihood. 
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dard logit estimators, they are nevertheless biased and with complicated, ambigu-
ous sampling properties. The interpretation of the estimates can be difficult and 
statistical inferences about the true parameters cannot be made (Johnston 1984). 
Whether they "work well" in a specific application can only be judged by whether 
they intuitively "look" reasonable, e.g., shrink the MLE "enough" (see Marx and 
Smith 1990 for another example). They are indeed helpful when, for some theoret-
ical reason, none of the variables can be dropped from the equation. In our case, 
however, our primary goal is to compare different models. Hence instead of relying 
on unreliable estimates from the full model, we can estimate the models separately 
and base the comparison on rigorous non-nested hypothesis testing techniques. 
Comparative studies: empirical results. We therefore estimate separately four 
models: the Downsian model, obtained by dropping the P and B terms from (2.7); 
the closeness model, obtained by dropping the P B and B terms from (2.7); the 
minmax regret model, obtained by dropping the P B and P terms from (2.7); and, 
a virtually "social-psychological" model formed by dropping all the P B, P and 
B terms from (2.7). The results are presented in Table 2.3-1 (1968) and Table 2.3-2 
(1980). The Downsian model, the closeness model and the minmax regret model 
are not nested (neither is a parametric special case of the other), therefore classical 
tests such as the likelihood ratio test are not appropriate. 21 Instead, non-nested 
hypothesis testing should be performed. In the appendix we discuss the testing of 
21The likelihood ratio test is applied in comparing the fourth model with others. 
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non-nested hypotheses and produce a convenient critical value table for one such 
test. To illustrate the use of the table, take the comparison between the P model and 
the Downsian model for the 1968 data. The two models have the same number of 
coefficients, but the absolute value of the log likelihood of the P model is 4.06 lower 
than that of the Downsian model (1 1 -12 = 4.06) which exceeds the critical value of 
3.32 for the P model to be the better model with probability 99%. Test results show 
that the P model outperforms all other models in both years with a probability of at 
least 90%, whereas the Downsian model is a "Condorcet loser" in both years. The 
minmax regret model is slightly better than the social-psychological model (model 
4) only for the 1968 data. 22 
In both years, Info., Educ. and Party are highly significant. This confirms findings 
in previous research that social-psychological factors are important predictors of 
voting behavior. U1 (alienation) and B13 (indifference) matters in the 1968 data, but 
not in 1980. The P B terms are not significant in either year, whereas the P terms are 
- thereby indicating that the Downsian model and the P model are substantially, 
as well as substantively different. In turnout, it is the closeness of the race itself 
that affects the decision, and not expected utility considerations. Intuitively, this 
finding is consistent with the argument that in a mass election the probability that 
any single vote can make any difference to the outcome is very small and hence 
22Note that the testing technique described in the appendix is designed for pairwise comparisons. 
When there are more than two models to be compared, conflicts in pairwise comparisons may occur 
(e.g., modell is preferred to model2, model3 is preferred to modell, but model3 is rejected when 
compared with model 2). However, it is not the case here. 
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so is P B; however, the closeness of the race, as a stimulating source that generates 
some psychological value of voting, need not be that high to have an impact on 
voting behavior. 
Note that the values of the P terms are not reliable because tests show that they 
are seriously affected by multicollinearity in both years. 23 However, the precision of 
the estimation of each P term is not an important issue here because we are mainly 
interested in whether the P terms matter as a whole group, and statistical testings 
on the significance of the whole group is not affected by the precision of each 
parameter within the group. Therefore, the comparison among different models 
is valid and we conclude that in predicting turnout, the P model outperforms the 
other models, although precise estimates of the parameters are unknown. 
To have some intuitive sense of how much the P model outperforms the rest, 
Figure 2.1-1 (1968) and Figure 2.1-2 (1980) demonstrate graphically the fit of the 
models. A model is better if for voters it gives a higher predicted probability of 
voting, and for non-voters it gives a lower predicted probability. The figures do 
show that the P model performs better than the others. The pattern is especially 
clear for the 1980 data. However, the differences among the four models are 
not dramatic, and it seems that we do not lose much by using the simple social-
psychological model. 
23We performed the diagnostic tests for all models and the results suggest that the problem is 
present in the P model, with the P terms being affected. Intuitively this is because the three P 
terms are correlated. For example, if P12 is high, then 1 and 2 are likely the major candidates and 3 
the minor candidate; hence, P13 and P23 are likely to be low. 
2.3. CANDIDATE VIABILITY AND STRATEGIC VOTING 65 
2.3 Candidate Viability and Strategic Voting 
In the last Section we compare the performance of several models in accounting 
for voting turnout behavior. Now we move on to the second stage of decision 
making, the decision to cast a specific vote given that a person goes to the polls. As 
mentioned earlier, the minmax regret model would predict that voters never vote 
for their second choice (see Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974 for proof). The "closeness 
model" provides no prediction for the candidate choice decision: it only states that 
closeness of the race would affect the turnout decision much the same way as the 
D term, which generates the same consumption value of voting itself regardless of 
who you vote for. The Downsian model, however, does provide some theory for 
the candidate choice decision. Consider the vote choice between first and second 
preferences.24 From equation (2.3) or (2.6), the utility difference between voting for 
a first versus a second preference is:25 
(2.8) 
so a rational voter will vote for candidate 1 if E 1 - E 2 > 0. Equation (2.8) indicates 
that the vote decision is affected by such strategic considerations like candidate 
viability, as reflected in the P terms. For example, if the first-ranked candidate is 
not viable- if P12 and P13 are small- then the voter is more likely to vote for his 
24Because third preference voting is a priori irrational as it is a dominated strategy, we only 
consider vote choice between the first and the second preferences. 
25See Black (1978, pp.612-613) for the algebra. 
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second choice, especially when the race between the second and third preferences is 
close and the utility difference between them is substantial (so that P23 B23 is high). 
Similar formulae can also be derived by directly imposing the above rationale as 
the basis of the decision rule in the vote choice decision (see, for example, Palfrey 
1989). 
So, testing the Downsian model in the candidate choice decision when more than 
two candidates are present is in fact a test of the notion of "strategic voting," which 
is itself an important topic because of its bearing on the stability of the two-party 
system. The failure of the two-party system to respond fully to tl1e imperatives 
of electoral competition from time to time has been evident, and periods of third 
party strength are indicators of this failure (c.f., Rosenstone et al. 1984). However, 
the two-party system persists and a major party candidate has won nearly every 
presidential election. In addition to the constraints on third party candidates 
arising from historical and institutional factors and from voters' loyalty to the two 
major parties, an important source of third party candidates' failure in presidential 
elections is strategic voting behavior based on the "wasted vote" logic. Abramson 
et al. (1982) write, "for the candidate with little chance of victory, the wasted vote 
logic becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because people perceive the candidate 
unlikely to win, they don't vote for him. Consequently, the candidate cannot 
win"(p.176). A quick look at the 1980 data reveals convincing evidence of this 
effect among voters who ranked Reagan first in their thermometer scores, 98% 
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voted for their first preference, and of those who most preferred Carter, 85%; but 
of those who most preferred Anderson, only 41% voted for him! 
Two attempts have been made to formally test for strategic behavior by Cain 
(1978) and Black (1978), using data from Britain and Canada, respectively. How-
ever, although expression (2.8) forms the theoretical basis of both of these studies, 
neither of them actually tested the influence of the P B terms in ways that are de-
scribed by this model. Black uses the P terms alone (because, he claims, they are 
the terms of "prime interest"), whereas Cain drops some relevant terms without 
any explanation. 26 Thus, the theoretical interpretations of their empirical findings 
are blurred. In the current analysis, we use the exact variables that are predicted to 
enter the utility calculation by the theory. Namely, we include P12B12, P13B13 and 
P23B23 as the independent variables. 
Table 2.4-1 reports the estimation results for the Downsian model. The signs 
of the P B terms are exactly as predicted by theory, and the parameters are all 
significant above the 0.05 level. The predictive power of the theory is indeed 
impressive. Recall, however, that in Section 2, we found the expected utility terms 
to be insignificant in predicting voting turnout. The same indices are used here, 
and the expected utility terms are highly significant. This reflects the distinctive 
nature of the two decision making situations. When making the turnout decision, a 
person compares the benefits of voting with the costs of voting. Given that the costs 
26-fhe tenns Cain drops are the U3 tenns, or the utilities for the third candidate. See Cain (1978), 
p.647. 
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of voting may not be negligible - voting at least costs the voter time with which 
he could engage in some possibly more enjoyable activity -and that the voter 
will have to pay the costs with certainty, any factor to be seriously considered as 
"benefits" will have to be of certain possibility and magnitude. Hence the expected 
utility terms cannot significantly affect the voter's decision because compared with 
the costs, they are immaterial. Rather, it is the social and psychological factors, the 
"consumption" value of voting, that outweighs the costs. 
However, when making the vote choice decision, the calculation of the voter is 
based solely on the comparison of the net benefits of voting for alternative candidates, 
with both the D terms (including the P terms) and the C terms in the turnout 
calculation being left out of the consideration because whoever he votes he pays 
the same costs and receives the same consumption value. So the question becomes: 
to what extent do the expected utility terms constitute the net benefits of voting 
for a specific candidate? Their role is thus much more significant here than in the 
turnout equation. 
Our last question, to what extent do the expected utility terms constitute the 
net benefits of voting for a specific candidate, immediately prompt another con-
sideration: are the expected utility terms, as operationalized, the only factors that 
enter the net benefits of voting for a candidate? The vote decision model (2.8) 
is a pure "investment" model, in which such important variables as partisanship 
play no role. Partisanship may enter the model by affecting the candidate utility 
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indices. However, research on the American electoral behavior has clearly con-
cluded that partisanship is a more stable factor than candidate evaluations and has 
an independent effect on the vote decision (cf. Niemi and Weisberg 1984). But 
then how do partisanship and other factors whose importance in the vote decision 
is well established, for instance, issue position and candidate characteristics, enter 
the calculus of vote decision in the expected utility maximization framework? 
Reflections on the development of the rational turnout models suggest a straight-
forward solution: one more term should be included in equation (2.3) or (2.7), a 
term that represents the consumption value of voting for the specific candidate, in ad-
dition to the D term, which is concerned with the consumption value of turnout. 
Let us denote this term by Dk. Feelings towards the candidates, party ID, distance 
from the issue position of the candidate are examples of factors that may enter D k· 
For example, the more strongly the voter identifies with candidate k's party, the 
more utility the voter will receive from voting for k because of the effects of party 
loyalty. We can therefore rewrite equation (2.7) as: 
and simple algebra leads us to the counterpart of model (2.8): 
(2.10) 
70 GiAPTER 2. RATIONAL VOTER MODELS 
Estimation results using equation (2.10) are reported in Table 2.4-2. Included 
in D1 - D2 are the thermometer scores for the first and the second preference 
(U1 and U2 ), and the difference of party !D's relative to the first and the second 
preference (Partyl- Party2 = Party).27 The prediction is that U1 and Party should 
positively affect first preference voting, and U2, negatively affect it. All coefficients 
have the predicted signs, and the Party variable and U 1 are significant. Tests of 
multicollinearity show that the precision of ul and u2 in 1968 and u2 in 1980 are 
affected, but all other parameters are reliable. In comparison with Table 2.4-1, we 
see that the model significantly increases the log likelihood for both years, and 
likelihood ratio tests28 show that the modified model outperforms the Downsian 
model. 
Figure 2.2-1 and Figure 2.2-2 show, using data from the 1968 and 1980 election 
respectively, the graphical comparison of three vote decision models: the Downsian 
model (2.8), the modified model (2.10) and a model containing only the D terms. A 
model is better if for first preference voters it gives a higher predicted probability of 
voting for the first preference, and for second preference voters, a lower prediction. 
From the figures we see that the modified model performs much better than the 
27The variables Party1 and PartY2 are constructed from the 7 point party ID variable. Suppose a 
voter's first preference is Reagan Then Party1 = 4 if the voter's party ID is 6 (strong Republican); 
Party1 = 3 if his party ID is 5 (weak Republican); Party1 = 2 if party ID is 4 or 3 (independent 
leaning Republican and Independent) and Party1 = 1 for all other party ID scores. The construction 
is similar if his first preference is Carter. H his first preference is Anderson, then Party1 = 4 if party 
ID is 3 (Independent); 3 if party ID is 2 or 4 (Partisan independent); 2 if party ID is 1 or 5 (weak 
partisan) and 1 if party ID is 0 or 6 (strong partisan). Party2 is obtained in a similar fashion. This 
construction measures both the direction and intensity of party ID relative to each preference. 
28Note that the Downsian model is nested in the modified model 
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other two for second preference voters, while for first preference voters the models 
are not dramatically different. The comparison between the modified model and 
the model without the P B terms suggests the importance of the P B terms in vote 
decision. In contrast to turnout, we see that the difference is not trivial. This again 
reflects the different nature of the two decisions. 
Model (2.10) actually tells us more. Note that if the first preference is a third 
party candidate, then P12B12 and Pt3Bt3 are both practically zero, as the probability 
of first place ties between a third party candidate and a major party candidate is 
basically nil. Therefore, voters who most prefer the third party candidate will vote 
for their first preference if: 
which implies that if the race between their second and last choice is close and they 
like the second choice a lot more than the last, then they are more likely to vote for 
their second choice than for their first choice. 
For voters preferring a major party candidate, P23 would be practically zero and 
they should vote for the first choice if: 
Table 2.4-3 presents the comparison. For the 1980 data, all voters favoring Ander-
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son are considered favoring a third party candidate, and for the 1968 data, those 
favoring Wallace in states where Wallace finished third are classified as such vot-
ers. The estimates reveal substantial differences between voters with preference 
for major and minor party candidates. For voters favoring a major party candidate 
("others"), the only variable that significantly affects their choice decision is party 
identification, and the P B terms obviously do not play an important role. For 
voters favoring a third candidate, however, P23B23 clearly enters their calculations. 
This means that in states where the race between a voter's second preference and 
her third preference is close, and if the voter prefers her second choice much more 
than she does her last, she would rationally vote for her second choice. This is pre-
cisely the evidence of strategic voting that causes the third party "squeeze." Figure 
2.3-1 (1968) and Figure 2.3-2 (1980) further show that for voters favoring a third 
party candidate, the strategic voting model performs better for second preference 
voters; whereas, for other voters, the model predicts first preference voters better. 29 
2.4 Information and Voter Heterogeneity 
In this section we turn to the topic of voter heterogeneity. Black (1978) notes 
that one major reason for the variation among voters is different levels of voter 
information Better informed citizens, he asserts, are more effectively rational and 
their voting behavior more predictable. Both Black (1978) and Palfrey and Poole 
29-J'his is partly due to the fact that there are more observations of second preference vote for 
voters favoring a third candidate than for the "other" voters. 
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(1987) find evidence for this notion in candidate choice behavior, conditional on 
voting. However, we know of no previous study that tests this notion at the 
voting turnout stage, nor any that discusses the methodological implications of 
this phenomenon and proposes a solution. We explore these issues in the current 
study, with a concentration on the methodological treatment. All results in this 
section are based on the 1980 data. We did not find clear evidence from the 1968 
data. This is because the objective information index as developed in Palfrey and 
Poole (1987) is not as informative for the 1968 data as for the 1980 data. The 1980 
election study provides data on the candidates' locations (reported by voters) on 
the seven-point scales of nine issues, while the 1968 study only has data on two 
issues. Also, the 1968 data are not validated. 
Define ''better informed voters" as those whose information scores exceed the 
average, and "less informed voters" as the rest of the the electorate. Table 2.5-
1 reports the estimation results of the turnout models for the two groups. The 
comparison reveals substantial differences between the two groups. First, the 
probability indices are significant only for the better informed group. The reason 
is simple: it is the subjective estimates of the probabilities that effectively enter 
the utility calculation, and because the better informed voters' estimates are more 
accurate, i.e., closer to the objective data, the objectively constructed indices are 
closer to the subjective estimates of the better informed and hence affect their 
decision more significantly. Another difference between the two groups is that 
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the better informed are more predictable. The model for this group has a much 
better fit and results in a much higher percentage of correct predictions. 30 This 
can be best seen from Figure 2.4. The model distinguishes voters from non-voters 
much better for the better informed group than for the less informed group. Our 
results thus provide clear evidence of the effective rationality notion in turnout 
decisionmaking. 
We also conducted the test on the candidate choice data and the evidence is not 
strong. We believe that this is because on average voters who participate are better 
informed than those who do not, and the variations among voters in the turnout 
group is small relative to that in the full sample. 
The existence of voter heterogeneity, though, raises questions about the ap-
propriateness of modelling turnout by the standard logit model. The logit model 
is now widely used because of the simplicity and intuitive interpretation of the 
probability expressions and ease of computation. However, this model is subject 
to serious restrictions, among them the homoscedasticity assumption. The ho-
moscedastidty assumption is not plausible in many situations. We have shown 
that voters vary in the accuracy of their utility calculations, which directly implies 
that the error terms in the utility functions are heteroscedastic. In general, esti-
mates of both the parameters and the choice probabilities using a homoscedastic 
300ne goodness-of-fit index is: R2 = 1 - i@, where L(O) and L(jj) are the initial log-likelihood 
and that at convergence respectively (c .f., Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). Correct classification results 
when the predicted choice (that having the highest predicted probability) by the model matches the 
real choice. 
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model will be inconsistent if the true model is heteroscedastic. Another reason 
why the problem of heteroscedasticity should receive attention is given by Downs 
and Rocke (1979), who demonstrate that the pattern of heteroscedasticity may hold 
important implications for substantive insights. Therefore, given the clear evi-
dence of heteroscedasticity in the turnout model, a heteroscedastic model should 
be employed. 
A class of heteroscedastic choice models is proposed in Chapter 1, with the het-
eroscedastic logit model being a special case. Dubin and Zeng (1991) explore the a p-
plication of the heteroscedastic logit model using a economic data set, and find that 
the model performs better than a standard logit model when heteroscedasticity is 
present. Assuming the utility that alternative i provides to individual t is u it' which 
consists of a deterministic component Vit (usually specified as Vit = I:r<=l x7tf3k with 
x the observed independent variables and f3 the unknown parameters to be esti-
mated) and an unobserved error term fit : Uit = Vit + fit' and assuming the error 
terms follow an extreme value distribution with variances V ar( fit) = 1 I 6 * ~ ,31 the 
t 
choice probabilities given by the heteroscedastic logit model are: 
I 
Pit = ev;tBt 1 E evitBt (2.11) 
i=l 
where Ot > 0 'Vt. 
Expression (2.11) is similar to the standard logit probabilities, except that the 
31Inthestandaidlogitmodel, Var(tit) = 1/6•~ Vi;Vt. 
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deterministic part of the utility functions, the v;t's, are weighted by Ot's that are 
inversely related to the standard error of the error terms. Intuitively this means 
that more weight is given to the utility functions of those individuals with smaller 
variances of the error terms. In our turnout problem, we assume that information 
is inversely related to the standard errors, and thus use it in place of () t' s (after 
transformed to take positive values only). Doing so we give more weight to the 
utility functions of the better informed voters. 32 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, although in general the heteroscedastic logit model 
may be nonlinear in the parameters, if Ot's are linear in parameters, as is the 
case here,33 then the heteroscedastic model can be estimated using a standard 
logit package after transformations of the independent variables. In our case, 
we only need to interact all explanatory variables including the constant term 
with information and use the resulting values as the new explanatory variables to 
estimate the model with a logit package. 34 
Table 2.5-2 reports the estimation results of the heteroscedastic logit turnout 
model as well as the standard logit turnout model35 for comparison. The results 
32Note that weighting the utility functions this way not only introduces heteroscedastidty, but 
also allows correlation between the error tenns, as voters with similar levels of infonnation are 
weighted similarly. 
33To use infonnation in places of O,'s is equivalent to assuming (J = a* Info., where a is an 
unknown parameter which cannot be identified from {3's in v;,. 
34It is important that for the model to be an appropriate random utility maximization model, (J t 
must be positive and must weigh the entire v;, component. See the derivation of the heteroscedastic 
G EV class in Chapter 1 for an explanation of this. We emphasize this fact here because our turnout 
problem is one of the situations in which, at first glance, we would consider interacting (J with only 
some of the explanatory variables, because it seems that information only affects the accuracy of 
the P tenns and hence interacts with these tenns only. We actually estimated such a model and it 
is no improvement over the original model at all; the log likelihood is even slightly lower. 
35-fhe P model is used as it is the best. See the discussion in Section 2. 
2.4. INFORMATION AND VOTER HEl'EROCENEITY 77 
are obtained only for turnout because, as described earlier, the variation in informa-
tion is much smaller within the voting group, and hence the effect of information 
on candidate choice decision is not strong. Using non-nested hypothesis testing, 
as discussed in the appendix, we see that given the two models have the same 
number of parameters and that since the difference in the log likelihood is higher 
than the critical value of 1.92 at a significance level of 0.05, we can assert that the 
heteroscedastic model is the better model with probability greater than 95%. A 
graphical comparison of the models is presented in Figure 2.5. A major differ-
ence between the two models is that the heteroscedastic model performs better in 
extreme probability margins. For example, for people who actually voted, the het-
erogeneous logit model predicts more of them to vote with probability higher than 
0.8 than the standard logit model does, and fewer of them to vote with probability 
lower than 0.4. For non-voters, it predicts fewer of them to vote with probability 
higher than 0.6, and more of them to have a probability of voting below 0.2. This 
suggests that the heteroscedastic model separate out the electorate more precisely 
than the standard logit. 
Next we wish to compare the implications of the two models for the importance 
of the independent variables in the turnout decision equation. We are especially 
interested in seeing how the role of the information index changes, if it does 
change from one model to another. For this purpose we need to compute the 
(estimated) partial derivatives or elasticities of the choice probabilities with respect 
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to the independent variables. We prefer using elasticities over partial derivatives 
because the former are normalized for the variables' units. An elasticity is the 
percentage change in one variable that is associated with a percentage change 
in another variable. So the elasticity of the turnout probability with respect to 
information is the percentage change in the turnout probability associated with a 
percentage change in the information level. Different individuals have different 
choice probabilities and hence different elasticities. We report the average elasticities 
and the aggregate elasticities of the turnout probabilities in Table 2.5-3. 36 
Examination of Table 2.5-3 reveals surprisingly large differences in the effects 
of information on turnout probabilities suggested by the two different models, 
while the effects of other explanatory variables do not vary much from one model 
to another. Both the average and aggregate elasticities of turnout probabilities 
with respect to information in the logit model round up to 0.16; whereas in the 
heteroscedastic model they are 0.54 and 0.57 respectively. Since the heteroscedas-
tic model is the superior model (with probabilities greater than 0.95), this result 
strongly suggests that information plays a more important role in turnout than 
previous analysis indicates. Downs and Rocke (1979) are indeed correct to assert 
that heteroscedasticity not only affects accuracy of estimation, but its analysis "can 
also provide political scientists with significant substantial information that would 
36 Aggregate elasticity measures the effect of a change in an independent variable on the expected 
slutre of a group choosing an alternative. Ben-Akiva and Lennan (1985, pp.112-113) showed that the 
aggregate elasticity associated with a unifonn percent change in some independent variable across 
all members of a group is a weighted average of the individual level elasticities using the choice 
probabilities as weights. 
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ordinarily go undetected as well as evidence of model misspecification"(p.816). 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter addresses some theoretical and methodological issues regarding ra-
tional voter models of voting behavior in presidential elections, and discusses a 
methodological treatment of voter heterogeneity. First, we distinguish models in 
which closeness of the race alone enters the voting calculus from the standard 
expected utility maximization models, arguing that the former are actually utility 
maximization models (pure "consumption" models) in which closeness is not a 
probability discount factor but an independent variable bearing its own substan-
tive meaning. This rationale not only formulates a distinct rational turnout model, 
but also implies that empirical support for the Downsian model based on the sig-
nificance of the P term is not valid. In comparing the various rational turnout 
models, we demonstrate through formal tests that, if variables specified by differ-
ent models are included in one general model, then severe multicollinearity exists 
that can damage the desirable properties of the maximum likelihood estimator, 
and inferences based on such estimators can be unreliable and misleading. Some 
alternative estimators are computed and their properties briefly discussed. We 
then estimate the turnout models separately and base our comparison of the mod-
els on rigorous non-nested hypothesis testing. For the turnout decision, empirical 
analysis of the 1968 and 1980 national election data suggests weak support for the 
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utility maximization model against the expected utility maximization model and 
the minrnax regret model. 
We note that the decision to participate and the decision to cast a vote for a 
particular candidate are of distinct types, and the importance of various variables, 
especially the expected utility terms, would be different between these decisions. 
This view is supported by the data, and we show that in the decision to cast a specific 
vote, unlike the decision to turnout, expected utility terms significantly affect the 
calculus. Furthermore, voters who favor a minor party candidate are more affected 
by such strategic considerations than the other voters, whose decisions are basically 
determined by such social-psychological variables as candidate evaluation and 
partisanship. These findings provide strong evidence for the notion of strategic 
voting in three candidate elections. 
Lastly, we address the question of voter heterogeneity. One source of hetero-
geneity in voting behavior is different levels of voter information, which introduces 
heteroscedasticity and makes the widely used standard logit models inappropri-
ate. The application of a heteroscedastic logit model is therefore discussed and is 
shown to significantly outperform the standard logit and to reveal stronger effects 
of voter information on voting decisions. A useful non-nested hypothesis testing 
technique is also discussed and its application simplified. 
Before ending, we offer some general remarks on the current study and its 
position in the literature. How voters make up their minds is one of the most 
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thoroughly studied topics in political science as well as one of the most contro-
versial ones. "There are countless ways of understanding voting," write Niemi 
and Weisberg (1984). We have a full range of all these seemingly different and 
even opposing models: the "social-historical" models, the "sociological" models, 
the "social-psychological" models, and the "rational voter" models. Within the 
rational voter category, our conclusion in Section 2 seemingly adds another "utility 
maximization" turnout model to the existing expected utility maximization model 
and the minmax regret model. However, viewed from a higher level, the controver-
sies and the classification of research methods are to a large extent artificial. Indeed, 
different methods emphasize different variables that affect voting behavior. But 
all relevant variables are an integrated part in determining how a voter acts. A 
voter is at the same time a "social-historical" being, a "psychological" being, and a 
"rational" being ("rational" in the narrow sense as understood in the rational voter 
model context). It is only that in different situations and for different individuals, 
a different being may dominate. All these ''beings" are but different aspects of the 
voter's characteristics. And thus viewed, all feelings, ideas, decisions, and actions, 
etc. are rational in the sense that they bring to him certain utilities, if utility is 
understood in a broad sense that includes all types of fulfillment and satisfactions 
(including satisfaction derived from, possibly, pain, for example). Using this utility 
concept we readily obtain a "unifying" model: a model in which voters maximize 
this "gross" utility. All the seemingly different models are just different faces of this 
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same one because the factors considered in each can all potentially be part of this 
gross utility. And the only question becomes in various situations exactly which of 
these factors may play a more significant role. 
In this view, our study does not propose any new models beyond this gross util-
ity maximization model (no studies really do), and it "merely" obtains empirical 
evidence of factors contributing to gross utility that are not tested or tested satis-
factorily before. Our findings suggest that, in turnout decision making, closeness 
of the race is a factor that independently contributes to the gross utility of voting 
as a measure of efficacy. Other potential contributors, such as the expected return 
from the election outcome or the utility difference indices associated with regrets, 
do not appear significant. In contrast, in candidate choice decision making, the 
expected utility factors do play a significant role, and they affect different voters in 
different ways. 
Although we believe there is an unified way of examining voting behavior, we 
do not think we are close to a perfect understanding of it. Niemi and Weisberg 
(1984) write that " ... we do not yet fully understand voting and elections." To this 
we might add that, "we can never fully understand voting," given the diversity and 
heterogeneity in any large population. Our results on voter heterogeneity provide 
dear evidence of this variation and reveal one source- information- for it. 
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Appendix: Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing 
Many of the familiar hypothesis testing situations involve nested models, i.e., one 
model (the restricted model) can be obtained from the other model (the unrestricted 
model) under the null hypothesis about the parameters. The t test on the significance 
of a parameter of a model, for example, is a testing of nested hypothesis, with the 
unrestricted model being the model estimated, the restricted model being a special 
case of this model when one of the parameters is zero. Statistical testing techniques 
are well developed for this type of hypothesis testing. The classical Wald, Lagrange 
Multiplier and likelihood Ratio tests are all for nested hypotheses. However, there 
are instances where we wish to compare two models, and one is not a special case 
of the other. The comparison of the various rational voter models is such a case. 
Neither can be obtained as a (parametric) special case of the other. Comparison 
of such models need to be carried out by non-nested hypothesis testing techniques. 
Non-nested hypothesis testing is not as mature as its nested hypothesis counterpart, 
however, we show below that one of such tests described by Ben-Akiva and Lerman 
(1985, pp.171-172) can be simple to use and we produce a mini-table of the critical 
values of the test. 
Suppose we need to compare model 1 and model 2 which are not nested. It 
was shown that, under the null hypothesis that modell is true, the following holds 
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asymptotically: 
Pr(p~- Pi > z) ::; { -[-2zL(O) + (!<2- K1)FI2}, z > 0, (2.12) 
where is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, p ~ is the adjusted 
likelihood ratio index for model h = 1, 2, p~ = 1 - Lh(f(~Kh, L(O) is the initial log 
likelihood of the models, and Lh(~) are the log likelihood at convergence of model 
h = 1, 2, Kh is the number of parameters of model h = 1, 2. Expression (2.12) 
means that the probability that model 1, which has the lower adjusted likelihood 
ratio index, is the true model is bounded by the right hand side of (2.12). Note 
that p~- PI= (l( 2)-l(lJ1~lK2-K11, where l(h) =I Lh(~) I and 1(0) =I L(O) 1. Hence the 
right hand side of (2.12) becomes: { -[2(1(1) -1(2) + (!<1- K2)F/2}. Now suppose 
we want to find the critical values of the (two-tailed) test at significance level 0.05. 
Because ( -1.96) = .025, we set [2(1(1)- 1(2)) + (K1- K2)p/2 = 1.96, then: 
1(1)- 1(2) = 1.92- 1/2(Kl- K2). 
This means, for example, that if the two models have the same number of parame-
ters, but model2's log likelihood is more than 1.92lower than model1's in absolute 
values, then the probability that model 1 is the true model is less than 0.05. Table 
A lists the critical values for some commonly used significance levels and various 
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1968 1980 1%8 
40.0 1508 .92* 
46.8 1370 .63* 
- - .64* 
- - .05 
- - .92 * 
- - .94* 
- - .95* 
2.29 1530 .60* 
- - .10 
- - .08 
- - .10 
- - .02 
- - .07 
.98 .55 
15 83 
t These are the variance proportions attributed to the smallest eigenvalues. 
*The corresponding coefficients are likely affected by multicollinearity. 
1980 1968 1980 
.76* .99* .99* 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* significant at .1 0 level. 
,.,. significant at .05 level. 
,.,.,. significant at .01 level. 
MLE t-Statistic 
1980 1968 1980 
0.08 4.34*** 0.23 
47.66 5.48*** 2.89*** 
56.98 2.35** 4.32*** 





Strategic Voting: Estimation of the Modified Model 
Variables MLE t-Statistic 
1968 1980 1%8 1980 
Const. -0.22 -1.65 -0.27 -1.36 
PB12 27.49 24.55 1.93* 1.37 
PB13 5.13 54.03 0.90 3.75*** 
PB23 -12.87 -29.95 -2.68*** -4.78*** 
U1 5.78 4.47 2.30** 1.98** 
U2 -4.19 -2.10 -1.77* -1 .02 
Party 0.37 0.33 4.19*** 2.86*** 
Initial LL: -586.63 -237.75 
LL at Conv.: -159.38 -90.69 
N: 842 343 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Elasticities of Choice Probabilities of the Logit and the Heteroscedastic 
Logit Turnout Models w .r.t. Independent Variables 
Variables Average Elasticity Aggregate Elasticity 
Logit Heteros. Logit Logit Heteros. Logit 
P12 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.30 
P13 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52 
P23 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.31 
Party 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 
Alien. 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.27 
Educ. 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 
Table A 
Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing: Critical Values of (11 -12) 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
99 
5 
0.01 5.82 5.32 4.82 4.32 3.82 3.32 2.82 2.32 1.82 1.32 0.82 
0.05 4.42 3.92 3.42 2.92 2.42 1.92 1.42 0.92 0.42 -0.08 -0.58 
0.10 3.86 3.36 2.86 2.36 1.86 1.36 0.86 0.36 -0.14 -0.64 -1.14 
a: significance level. 
kl,2: Number of Parameters in model1, 2. 
Formula: li - l2 = c - (ki - kz) /2 
where c = 3.32 for a. = 0.01; c= 1.92 for a.= 0.05 and c = 1.36 for a.= 0.10. 
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Figure 2.1-1 
Performance of Rational Turnout Models: the 1968 Data 
Voters 
--Model 1: D and PB Terms 
- Model 2: D and P Terms 
- Model 3: D and B Terms 
········ Model4: D Terms Only 
Probability of Voting 
00 14% s:; 
0 ...... Non-Voters 
~ 
12 ro 





- Model 2: D and P Terms 
- Model 3: D and B Terms 
········ Model 4: D Terms Only 
......... 8 ro 
~ 
0 













Probability of Voting 
101 
Figure 2.1-2 
Performance of Rational Turnout Models: the 1980 Data 
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Figure 2.2-1 
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Figure 2.2-2 
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Figure 2.3-1 
Predictability of Voters Favoring a Third Candidate 
in Comparison with Others: the 1968 Data 
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Figure 2.5 
Performance of the Standard Logit and the Heteroscedastic 
Logit Voting Turnout Models: the 1980 Data 
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Chapter 3 
Congressional Career Decisions 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies choice behavior in congressional career decisions. Except the 
few congressmen who died in office or were expelled or were appointed to other 
offices, at the end of each term most members of the House face a career choice 
situation: they can choose to run for reelection, or to retire, or to seek other office 
(typically governor or U.S. senator) if an opportunity exists. A congressman's 
career choice decision reveals, of course, his motivation and direction of ambition, 
which "lie at the heart of politics" (Schlesinger, 1966, p.1). Moreover, it is how such 
choices are made that increasingly determines the overall level of House turnover 
and the composition of the House membership, which in turn "relate to partisan 
politics, to congressional reform, to basic indicators of congressional vitality and 
development stage, and to the nature of public policy and changes in that policy'' 
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(Moore and Hibbing 1991, p.6). The choice among the three options "increasingly" 
determines the turnover level and membership composition because the House 
seat is becoming safer and the probability of defeat in reelection is decreasing (e.g., 
Bauer and Hibbing 1989). Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of members that were 
defeated, that retired, and that sought higher office (governor or senator) in each of 
the 20 congresses from 1947 to 1986. Indeed, while the rate of seeking higher office 
has been slightly increasing, and retirement rate has experienced great changes, 
the general trend of the defeat rate in reelections has been going down. 
Many scholars recognize the importance of studying congressional career de-
cisions. Rohde (1979) and Brace (1984) address progressive ambition of House 
members and study how they make the decision to run for higher office. A rela-
tively large body of literature, partly triggered by the big shifts in retirement rate in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, concerns voluntary retirement from the House (e.g., Brace 
1985; Frantzich 1978; Hibbing 1982; Moore and Hibbing 1991). A recent study by 
Schansberg (1992) attempts to model the decisions in both directions. This research 
identified many variables that are potentially responsible for congressional career 
decisions, and shed light on the substantive meanings of and roles played by these 
variables. It is, however, far from complete or satisfactory. With the exception of 
Schansberg (1992), previous research is mostly involved with the study of binary 
choices. Rohde and Brace study choices between seeking reelection and seeking 
higher office, with members who decide to retire excluded from the sample. The 
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literature on retirement analyzes choices between seeking reelection and retiring, 
with members who decide to run for higher office excluded from the sample. In 
effect, these studies were not analyzing the unconditional probabilities of members 
choosing to retire, to seek reelection, or to run for higher office, but rather the con-
ditional probability of choosing retirement over seeking reelection given that they 
have not otherwise chosen to run for higher office, or the conditional probability of 
seeking higher office versus remaining in the House given that the member has not 
otherwise chosen to retire. Conditional probabilities only show us an incomplete 
picture of the choice situation. We learn how a congressman chooses from a subset 
of all possible alternatives, but nothing about how the subset is chosen. Moreover, 
many authors are not aware of this fact. The subsample used is often taken as the 
whole sample, and variables affecting the conditional probabilities are interpreted 
as affecting the unconditional probabilities. In Rohde (1979), for example, members 
who "announce their retirement at the end of a term are not considered to have had 
an opportunity to run for higher office" (p.13). In fact about two thirds of them do 
have an opportunity, and they choose not to run for it. Simply excluding them is not 
justified, and may also lead to failure of identifying relevant variables that enter 
the choice calculation. For example, previous studies of voluntary retirement have 
not considered such variables as opportunity for higher offices as possible sources 
that affect the probability of retiring from the House. It may be the case that these 
variables do not affect the conditional probability of retiring versus seeking reelec-
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tion, given that the option of seeking higher office has not been chosen. However, 
to the extent they play an important role in members' decision to seek higher office 
or not, they affect the probability of choosing the sub choice set { retire, reelection}, 
and can thus affect the probability of retiring. 
Schansberg (1992) avoids the above problems and considers the full range of 
choices. Unfortunately, this study runs into another problem of sample treatment: 
it treats all members as having all three options, and models how a member chooses 
to seek higher office even if he does not have an opportunity to do so. This 
causes serious problems in the properties of the estimators and the substantive 
interpretation of the results, because more than one third of the members do not 
have an opportunity for higher office. A figurative summary of the problems in 
sample treatment by previous research is presented in Figure 3.2. 
In this chapter, we seek to overcome the weaknesses in previous research and 
to study congressional career decisions in a rigorous fashion. Using data from 
the twenty congresses spanning 1947 to 1986, we examine three possible career 
options: retiring (including leaving for unimportant offices such as small city 
mayor), seeking reelection, and seeking higher office (governor or senator). All 
members of the 20 congresses are included in the sample except those died in 
office, expelled, or appointed to another office- those who do not really have a 
choice.1 The chapter unfolds as follows: Section 2 concerns the theoretical aspects 
1 Also excluded are the few who run for offices other than governor or Senator that are of certain 
significance (e.g., vice president, state-level supreme court judge). Decisions to run for such offices 
have their own peculiar nature and the sample is too small for systematic study. 
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of the analysis. We discuss rational choice behavior in the context of congressional 
career decisions, setting up a framework in which variables that enter the decision 
making can be identified. We then proceed to the discussion of the choice model and 
estimation strategy. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. We begin with the 
specification of relevant variables based on previous research. We then present the 
estimation results of the choice model and discuss their substantive meanings and 
implications. Finally, Section 4 offers concluding remarks, and identifies problems 
deserving of future research. 
3.2 A Model of Congressional Career Decisions 
We begin by assuming that congressmen are rational in the sense of expected 
utility maximization. Consider the choice situation a congressman faces at the end 
of each term. If he has an opportunity to run for a higher office, his choice set is 
J = {at, a2, a3}, where at =retire, a2 = run for reelection to the house, and a3 = 
run for a higher office. 2 If he does not have an opportunity for higher office, he 
chooses between at and a2. Under the rationality assumption, a representative 
will choose option a i if and only if the expected utility of a i is greater than that 
of all other available options. The following analysis considers members with all 
three options. The analysis for the other members can be carried out in the same 
2As in Rohde (1979), a House member is considered to have an opportunity for higher office if 
an election is held in his state for a Senate seat or the governorship, and there is not an own party 
incumbent seeking reelection to the office in question. Also, odd-year governorships are excluded 
because it is not of an exclusive nature. 
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way. A graphical illustration of the choice situation is presented in Figure 3.3. If 
the congressman chooses to retire, he retires with probability P1 = 1, receiving the 
utility of retirement U1; if he chooses to run for reelection, he wins the reelection 
with probability P2, receiving utility of the House seat U2 minus the cost of running 
for the election C2, and loses (hence retires) with probability 1-P2, receiving U1- C2; 
if he chooses to run for higher office, he wins with probability P3 , receiving the 
utility of the higher office seat U3 minus the cost of seeking the seat C3, and loses 
(hence retires) with probability 1- P3, receiving U1- C3. Let Ei denote the expected 
utility of choosing option ai, then, 
E1 Ut 
E2 P2U2 + (1 - P2)Ut - C2 
- Ut + P2(U2- Ut)- C2 (3.1) 
E3 - P3U3 + (1- P3)Ut- C3 
Ut + P3(U3- Ut)- C3. 
As any affine transformation of an expected utility function is also an expected 
utility function (Varian 1984), subtracting Ut from all Ei, we can rewrite (3.1) as: 
Et - 0 
E2 - P2(U2- Ut)- C2 (3.2) 
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E3 = P3(U3- U1)- C3. 
Expressions (3.2) states that if we normalize the expected utility of "retire" as 
zero, then the expected utility of "run for reelection" depends on the probability of 
winning the reelection, the value of the House seat relative to the value of retirement, 
and the cost of seeking reelection; and the expected utility of seeking higher office 
depends on the probability of winning the higher office, the value of the higher 
office relative to the value of retirement, and the cost of seeking the higher office. 
An important difference between our specification and that in Rohde (1979) is that 
in ours both the expected utilities of seeking reelection and seeking higher office 
depend on the value of retirement, while in Rohde (1979) they do not. Because 
we do not have specific data on the value of retirement, U 1 is implicitly expressed 
in terms of the expected utilities of the House seat and higher office seat. As a 
consequence, E 2 and E3 are correlated because they both depend on the value 
of retirement. Operationally, this implies that no variable that enters E 2 should 
be excluded a priori from E3, or vice versa. We will discuss the identification of 
variables entering E's later. 
Given the expected utilities of the options, the congressman then chooses the 
option with the greatest E. Had we known the deterministic values of Ej's, we 
could easily predict with certainty which option the congressman will choose. 
Unfortunately, in empirical research we can never know the exact values of E's, 
which are functions of many variables only part of which are observable or are 
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measurable. The empirical modeling of E's hence always includes errors, and the 
prediction of the choice behavior can only be in probability terms. Therefore our 
next task is to select a choice model which gives the probabilities of choosing to 
retire, to seek reelection, or to seek higher office based on the empirical values of 
E's. 
It may seem likely that the career choices have a two-level tree structure. For 
example, the congressman may first decide whether to run for higher office or 
not (the first level), if not, then he chooses between seeking reelection and retiring 
(second level). If "seeking reelection" and "retiring" are considered to be "similar" 
alternatives, then a model that specifically allows for correlation between the error 
terms of the two alternatives, such as a nested logit model, may be appropriate. 
We estimated such models, and found, through hypothesis testings, that the tree 
structure with {retire, run for reelection} as the second-level sub-choice set is more 
likely the "true" structure than the other two possibilities. However, we do not 
get meaningful estimates for the similarity parameter in this model (it is not in the 
admissible range (0,1] for the model to be proper probability choice model). There 
are two possibilities that could lead to this situation. First, it may be the case that 
congressional career decisions cannot be described by a tree structure. Second, 
it may be the case that the decisions do have a tree structure, but the marginal 
probabilities in the sub-choice set (the probability of seeking reelection and the 
probability of retiring) are extremely skewed, causing the similarity parameter to 
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fall out of the admissible range (Barsch-Supan 1990). 
To avoid making any ungrounded assumptions about the nature of the errors 
in E's, then, we will adopt a "mother logit" model, which is shown by McFadden 
(1975) to be extremely general and can represent any choice probabilities under 
the correct specification of the utility functions. As formulated by Train (1986), let 
P;~ = f(z;n;Zjn, 'Vj =J i;sn) be the "true" probability that decision-maker n chooses 
alternative i, where z;n is the observed data relating to alternative i as faced by 
decision-maker n, z jn is the observed data relating to alternatives other than i, and 
sn is a vector of characteristics associated with the decision-maker. There is no 
restriction on the functional form off so this specification is completely general. 
All choice models are special cases of this model, including the standard logit and 
probit models. 
Now define W;n = logPtn and evaluate the logit probabilities based on W;n: 
elogP;"n 
- = p .• 
"' logP• m' L..,j e Jn 
(3.3) 
where the last equality is due to the fact that choice probabilities necessarily sum 
to one. 
Equation (3.3) shows that any choice probability Pi~ can be expressed in the logit 
probability form, with Win being the deterministic utility of alternative ito decision-
maker n? Note that in general Win = log Ptn depends not only on observed data 
3Recall that in a logit specification like (3.3) the underlying (expected) utility for alternative i is 
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relating to alternative i, but also on data relating to all other alternatives. Hence 
the mother logit model is not subject to the ITA (Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives) property as a standard logit model does. The ITA property holds if 
the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is not affected by the 
presence of other alternatives, which is unlikely the case in our congressional career 
choice situation. 
The next question is, of course, the appropriate specification of W i,4 the utility 
functions of model (3.3). Once we obtain Wi we can estimate a logit-form model 
straightforwardly. As noted above, Win = log Ptn depends on (expected) utilities of 
all alternatives. Hence all variables that enter the utility function of any alternative 
may enter each Win· From the expected utility functions (3.2), we have 
Let X denote the vector of variables that appear in gi, and assume, for simplicity, 
that g/s are linear, then 
wi = f3iX, 
where f3i is a vector of coefficients. The choice probabilities are therefore given by 
ef3;X 
pi= 2:: {J ·X' 
j e ' 
assumed to be W;n + t:;n, where t:;n is the stochastic part of the total utility of alternative i. 
4For simplicity of notations, we hereafter drop the subscript n in W;n. 
(3.4) 
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where the index j runs from 1 to 2 if the choice set contains two alternatives, and 
from 1 to 3 if the choice set contains three alternatives. 5 
Let Cin = 1 if individual n chooses alternative i, and c;n = 0 otherwise, then the 
log-likelihood of observation n is: 
I 
ln(f3) = LCinlnPin , 
i=l 
where {3 denotes coefficients in Pin to be estimated; I = 2 if individual n has two 
alternatives, and I = 3 if individual n has three alternatives; Pin is given by (3.4). 
The total sample log-likelihood is then given by 
N 
L({3) = L ln(f3). 
n=1 
Maximum likelihood estimates of {3 can be obtained by maximizing L({3) with 
respect to {3. The computation can be carried out using a standard statistical 
package. 
As only utility differences matter, from (3.4) we can write (taking the case of three 
choices as an example): 
e<l3t-132)X 
p1 = -e(::-::13,-t-....,132"""')c-:-X:-+-1_+_e"""'"<-:::-133-_-=132-:-)x= 
5The reader can see that we assume the functional fonn of W 1 and W2 are the same for members 
with three choices and those with two choices. We have estimated a model in which the utility 
functions are allowed to have different variables and coefficients for the two groups of House 
members, but tests show that the two models are statistically indistinguishable. 
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or 
1 
p 1 = 1 + eU32-.6J)X + e (.63 - ,6J) X. 
P2 and P3 can be expressed similarly. Estimation of the model will give fh - {31 and 
/33- /31, if the first alternative is taken as the base of normalization; or it gives {31 - {32 
and /33 - /32, if the second alternative is taken as the base of normalization. The case 
is similar if the third alternative serves as the base. To normalize the utilities using 
different bases can often facilitate the interpreting of estimation results, as f3; - /3) 
affects the conditional probability of choosing alternative i over j given the third 
alternative is not chosen, or the unconditional probabilities if there are only two 
alternatives. Take the probability of choosing the first alternative as an example. 
Suppose we use the second alternative as the base of normalization (which we do 
in this study in order to facilitate comparison of empirical results with previous 
research), if there are two alternatives, 
and it is easy to verify that 
(3.5) 
which are signed by {31 - /32. Hence we can infer the direction of the effects on P1 
by an independent variable x directly from the sign of the estimated coefficient of 
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x. If there are three alternatives, then 
where the second fraction is the probability of choosing the sub choice set {1, 2}, 
and the first fraction is the conditional probability of choosing alternative 1 over 
alternative 2 given that the subset {1, 2} is chosen. This conditional probability has 
the same functional form as the unconditional probability in the 2-choice case, and 
a similar analysis will show that its partial derivatives are signed by ({3 1 - {32). In 
the empirical analysis below we will report the estimates of ({3 1 - f3z), ({33 - {32 ) and 
({33- /31) to facilitate pairwise comparisons. 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
We now tum to the empirical analysis of congressional career decisions in the 
framework of the model developed a?ove. Our first task, of course, is to identify 
variables that enter X, the vector involving U~, Uz, U3, Pz, P3, Cz, and C3. That is, we 
need to specify variables that reflect the values of retirement, of the House seat, and 
of the higher office seat; the probability of winning the House reelection, and of 
winning the higher office seat; and the cost of seeking reelection or seeking higher 
office. Based on theoretical considerations and on results from previous research, 
we include the following variables: 
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(1) Age. Age plays an important role in members' evaluation of the career 
options. The elderly will derive less utility from serving in the House or higher 
office, for the jobs are mentally, emotionally and physically demanding. It is 
therefore not surprising that previous studies, without exception, observe that the 
rate of voluntary retirement increases with age. In comparing the House seat 
with higher office seat, however, we would expect age to be inversely related to the 
propensity to seek the latter option, because "the older a politician is the less chance 
he has for promotion and the less likely he is to harbor ambitions to advance" (Hain 
1974, p.265). 
(2) Republican. A dummy variable that registers whether the member belongs 
to the minority party, which, for the period covered by this study, has almost always 
meant the Republican. Many scholars realize the disutility the minority party 
status brings to the member. The commonly cited reasons include the ideological 
frustration felt by the Republicans as they watch the Democratic majority preside 
over the growth of the federal government, and the fact that Republicans are 
blocked from committee chairmanships (Hibbing 1982). Being a Republican thus 
is expected to encourage a member to leave the House in both ways: retiring or 
seeking higher office (particularly seeking higher office, according to both Gilmour 
and Rothstein 1991 and Schansberg 1992). 
(3) Chair/Leader. A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the member is the 
chair of a standing committee or a majority party leader, 0 otherwise. This variable 
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is meant to reflect that the House seat is particularly valuable for the member, 
and should therefore encourage him to stay. Previous researchers often use the 
seniority rank of the member in the House to indicate the value of his House seat. 
There are two problems associated with this. First, the seniority rank is very highly 
correlated with age, causing difficulties in interpreting the estimated parameters. 
Second, it is not really seniority rank per se but formal positions held that captures 
the value of the House seat, and the correlation between the two is decreasing in 
the modern Congress. 
(4) Ideol.Pos.Dem and Ideol.Pos.Rep. A pair of variables that denote the mem-
ber's ideological position within his party caucus, calculated separately for Demo-
crat and Republican members. The value of the variable is the member's percentile 
rank on an underlying liberal-conservative dimension derived by scaling their roll-
call votes with Poole and Rosenthal (1985)'s NOMINATE procedure. The higher 
the percentile ranking, the more conservative the member and the more likely he 
is expected to retire (Frantzich 1978, Moore and Hibbing 1991). 
(5) Institutional Reform. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the member 
is elected before the 91st congress and serves in the four subsequent ones, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is meant to reflect the effects of the institutional changes 
in or around 1970 that are believed by many authors to diminish the relative value 
of the House seat. Such changes include improved retirement pensions, require-
ment of financial disclosure, declined seniority system, to name a few (Brace 1985, 
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Hibbing 1982). The effects should be small for members entering the congress after 
the changes, and should decrease over time, as partly evidenced by the decreased 
aggregate level of retirement in the 1980's. We expect that members seriously af-
fected by the changes (having value 1 for the dummy variable) will more likely to 
either retire from the House or to seek higher office. 
(6) Previous Margin. The vote percentage received by the member in the pre-
vious election, which should serve as an indicator of the member's safeness in the 
next election, and which is therefore expected to enter into P2 and C2 • However, as 
observed by many scholars, the House seat is becoming safer and safer, and defeat 
rate is steadily decreasing over the years. Hence this variable may not be playing 
a significant role as it seems on the surface. This is indeed the case in our findings. 
(7) Scandal. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the member is charged 
with scandals, 0 otherwise. The reason to include this variable is obvious. Charge 
of scandal reduces the probability of the incumbent winning the election, and 
increases the cost of campaign (Peters 1980). Furthermore, in the face of decreasing 
electoral competition, it is one of the only few sources that determine the member's 
fate in the election. While in our data no member charged with scandals ever tries 
to run for higher office, we expect such members are also discouraged for reelection 
and are therefore more likely to retire. 
(8) Redistricting. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the member is seri-
ously hurt by redistricting- if he has to run against another incumbent or if he has 
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to appeal to a completely new constituency - and 0 otherwise. The effects of re-
districting are widely recognized (Bullock 1972, Fiorina et al. 1975, Frantzich 1978), 
and Brace (1984, 1985) finds empirical evidence that members hurt by redistricting 
are more likely to retire or to seek higher office. 
(9) Constituency Overlap. This variable is the reciprocal of the number of 
districts in the member's state. Rohde (1979), Brace (1984) and Schansberg (1992) 
all find that members from smaller states are more likely to run for higher office, 
because the overlap of the constituencies makes campaign easier and the race less 
risky. In estimating the choice model we use the logarithm of this variable due 
to the expectation that the effects of this variable are increasingly strong when the 
size of the state decreases. 
(10) Senate Election. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a Senate 
election, 0 otherwise, is meant to reflect the value of the higher office seat. Rohde 
(1979) and Brace (1984) find that a House member values a Senate seat more than a 
governor seat, because the former has longer terms and is electorally safer. So the 
opportunity for the Senate would encourage a member to seek higher office. 
(11) Open Seat-Senate. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a Senate 
election and the seat is not sought by an incumbent, 0 otherwise. This variable 
obviously affects the probability of winning the Senate seat. Without exception, 
previous research reports that an open seat opportunity greatly encourages a House 
member's propensity to run for higher office (Rohde 1979, Brace 1984, Schansberg 
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1992). 
(12) Open Seat-Governor. Similar to Open Seat-Senate. 
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Table 3.1 reports the mean values of the variables for members retiring, seeking 
reelection, and seeking higher office, respectively. The entries provide a rough 
idea of how these variables affect the career decisions. They may be misleading 
however, because the effects of other variables are not controlled. Keep this in mind 
and we are safe for an initial investigation. Age, as expected, encourages retirement 
but discourages higher office seeking. Minority party members are more likely to 
retire or seek higher office (the latter turns out to be spurious). Standing committee 
chairs or majority party leaders are more likely to retire- this is obviously due 
to the effect of age, as such members are normally old. Conservative members 
of the Democratic party tend to retire more than the liberals, while the latter are 
more likely to seek higher office (the effects are less obvious for the Republicans). 
Institutional reform apparently does diminish the value of the House seat. The 
previous vote margin of a House member is typically large, but it does not seem 
to figure much into the career decisions. The effects of scandal charge is in the 
expected direction, as are the effects of the redistricting variable. The last four 
variables, as expected, all encourage progressive ambition, although they do not 
seem to affect the choice between staying in the House and retiring. 
Table 32 reports the estimation results of the choice model, from which we can 
learn the independent effects of the variables. Recall from the discussion in Section 
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2 that we can infer the following from the estimated coefficients: for members 
without an opportunity for higher office, the directions of impacts on choice prob-
abilities by independent variables; for members with an option to run for higher 
office, the directions of impacts on conditional probabilities by independent vari-
ables. The first two columns of the table give (31 - (32 and their t-statistics, from which 
we see that in choosing between seeking reelection and retiring, the effects of age, 
minority party status, ideological location for members of the Democratic party, 
institutional reform, scandal charge, and redistricting are all statistically significant 
and in the expected direction. We should point out that the effects of the ideo-
logical location of the Democrats are partly generated by the fact that Democratic 
members from the South are more conservative than the rest and have a greater 
propensity to retire. When the model is reestimated with Southern Democrats ex-
cluded, the ideology variable for the Democrats is no longer statistically significant 
at the standard significance level (the t-statistic drops to 1.76). The coefficient of all 
other variables in the model are not statistically different from zero. While this may 
not be surprising for the variables that mainly reflect the value of the higher office 
seat (Senate Election) or the probability of winning the seat (Const. Overlap, Open 
Seat-Senate, and Open Seat~ovemor), the finding that a standing committee chair 
or a majority leader is no less likely to retire than other members, everything else 
equal, is not at all expected. This implies that formal positions held will not deter 
a member from retreating from politics, if other factors amount to favoring the 
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option. Nor do they deter members from running for higher office (column 3 and 
4). Previous vote margin does not figure into the career decisions, either. This 
confirms Bauer and Hibbing (1989)'s conclusion that the level of competition in 
congressional elections has declined. Another variable that has no effect on career 
decisions is the ideological location of Republican members, given the effect of the 
minority party status and other variables controlled. 
Column 3 and 4 of Table 3.2 report (33- (32 and their t statistics. The effects of age, 
institutional reform, degree of constituency overlap, opportunity for Senate seat 
and probability of winning higher office seat are as expected in choosing between 
seeking reelection and seeking higher office. There are two findings, however, 
that are quite novel. One is that being a Republican per se does not encourage 
higher office seeking, contrary to Gilmour and Rothstein (1991) and Schansberg 
(1992)'s statements. This is probably due to the fact that while Schansberg's results 
are problematic due to the incorrect sample treatment, Gilmour and Rothstein 
reach the conclusion by examining aggregate data, without controlling for other 
variables like age and the opportunity for higher office seat. Indeed, our data show 
that the higher aggregate level of higher office seeking by Republicans, observed 
by Gilmour and Rothstein for the period of 1972-1988 in their study, is due to the 
historical fact that during this period Republicans were on average younger, had 
better opportunities, were from smaller states, and were hurt more by redistricting. 
Another finding that has not been reported in previous research is that liberal 
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members of the Democratic party have a greater propensity of seeking higher office 
seat. To the extent that the House serves as a stepping stone to the Senate, this 
helps to explain the ideological polarization, i.e., the greater disparity in the voting 
records of Senate Democrats and Republicans, described in Poole and Rosenthal 
(1984). 
To complete the pairwise comparisons, the last two columns of Table 3.2 report 
f33 - /31 and their t-statistics, obtained from estimating the model using the first 
alternative "retiring" as the base of normalization. Age, as expected, strongly 
discourages higher office seeking in comparison with retirement. Minority party 
members are more likely to retire than seeking higher office - again contrary 
to conclusions from previous research. Conservative members of the Democratic 
party (e.g., the Southern Democrats) are also more likely to retire, compared with 
either seeking reelection or seeking higher office. The last four variables, reflecting 
the value of the higher office seat or the probability I cost of winning it, all strongly 
encourage higher office seeking. All other variables, however, do not significantly 
affect the choice between retiring and seeking higher office. 6 
From Table 3.2 we can only infer to which direction the independent variables 
affect choice probabilities in pair-wise comparisons. To measure the extent of the 
effects or, for members with three choices, to infer even the directions of the effects 
on the unconditional probabilities will require other measures. For our purpose we 
6Scandal charge do not have significant coefficients when comparing seeking higher office with 
other alternatives, due to the fact that no members charged with scandals have tried to run for 
higher office, therefore the variances of the coefficients blow up. 
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report in Table 3.3 the average elasticities of the choice probabilities with respect 
to continuous independent variables, a log pI a log X = ( EJP I ox) I (PI X), and the 
average percentage change in choice probabilities with respect to the change in a 
dummy variable from zero to one, holding other variables constant. 7 Calculation 
of entries in Table 3.3 is based on re-estimation of the model with insignificant 
variables excluded (such that the entries are statistically non-zero). From Table 
3.3 we see that the effects on the probability of retiring are greatest by scandal 
charge and age, next are minority party status, redistricting, ideological position 
of the Democratics, and institutional reform. 8 We also see that for members with 
opportunity for higher office, the set of variables that primarily affect the value of 
higher office seat or the probability of winning it (Constit. Overlap, Senate Election, 
Open Seat-Senate, and Open Seat-Governor) all decrease the probability of retiring. 
To see why, recall that 
e(/31-fh.)X 
Pt = e(IJI-fh.)X + 1 + e(/33-fh.)X. (3.6) 
Therefore if a variable affects either the utility difference between retiring and seek-
ing reelection or the utility difference between seeking higher office and seeking 
reelection, it will affect the unconditional probability of retiring from the House. 
7For Senate Election, the change is from Senate Election = 0 and Open Seat-Senate = 0 to Senate 
Election = 1 and Open Seat-Senate =real sample value; For Open Seat-Senate, the change is from Senate 
Election = 1 and Open Seat-Senate = 0 to Senate Election = 1 and Open Seat-Senate= 1. 
8Bear in mind, however, that the entries in Table 3.3 are samples of random variables and hence 
the conclusions are not in the exact sense. 
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The opportunity variables do not significantly affect the utility differences between 
retirement and remaining in the House, but they do all act to increase the utility dif-
ference between seeking higher office and remaining in the House, thus increasing 
the denominator of (3.6) and reducing the probability of choosing retirement. 
Other entries in Table 3.3 can be interpreted in a similar fashion. We see that 
redistricting, the existence of a Senate election, age, and a Senate open seat all have 
great impact on the probability of choosing to run for higher office. The effects 
of other variables are relatively smaller. For the probability of choosing to run for 
reelection, the effect of age is smaller for members with the choice of seeking higher 
office. The reason is that while age encourages retirement, it discourages higher 
office seeking, hence reduces the net effect on the probability of remaining. The 
effect of redistricting is stronger for such members because it encourages leaving 
the House in both ways. 
In the introduction section we indicated the importance of individual career 
decision making in determining the long term membership composition of the 
House. Indeed, the effects are cumulating. Figure 3.4 shows that as a result of the 
Republicans being more likely to retire, and as a whole also more likely to seek 
higher office due to reasons discussed earlier, the percentage of Republicans in the 
House is decreasing with terms served. Similarly, because members from smaller 
states (greater constituency overlap) are more likely to leave the House for Higher 
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office,9 such members are few among seniors. This means that districts in small 
states or that have elected a Republican are more likely to be represented by junior 
members lacking experience and connections. That fewer Republicans ever build 
up their seniority also explains, from another angle, the Democratic dominance of 
the House. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter formulates and estimates an integrated model of congressional career 
decisions in a rigorous fashion, and examines the impact of factors that enter the 
decision making on both the conditional and unconditional choice probabilities. 
While some of our findings confirm previous research or conform to expectations, 
others offer fresh insight into the nature of the decision making process. Notably, 
we find that formal positions held and previous vote margins do not figure into 
House members' career decisions, and being a Republican per se does not encourage 
progressive ambition. We also see that a number of factors previously identified as 
predisposing House members to seek higher office also affect retirement decision. 
Our analysis also reveals, for the first time, the direction and extent of the effects 
of independent variables on the unconditional probabilities of choosing the con-
gressional career options. Even more important, however, is what such an analysis 
tells us about those who choose to stay. Given that it has become rare for House in-
9They are also less likely to retire, but the effects is much smaller compared with the propensity 
to seek high office, so that the net effect on the decision to stay is negative. Refer to Table 3.3. 
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cumbents to fail in their reelection bids, it is the joint effect of progressive ambition 
and voluntary retirement that has come to increasingly determine the composition 
of the House of Representatives, which in turn bears on the policy outcomes of the 
Congress. 
In closing, we shall point out a potential problem deserving of future research. 
Because our data are panel data - each member is repeatedly sampled until he 
leaves the House - auto-correlation of errors in the expected utility functions is 
likely present. The fact that the cross-sectional sample size is far bigger than the 
number of repetitions (the data set includes nearly 2,000 different individuals who 
on average serve only about 5 terms) may lighten the harm of the problem, but may 
not eliminate it. Although in theory the mother logit model employed in this study 
applies to error structures of general patterns, we expect that the performance of 
the model can be improved if the information on the error structure is explicitly 
incorporated. We leave the search of a suitable model that has good theoretical 
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Table 3.1 
Mean Values of Factors Affecting Congressional Career 
Decisions: A Comparison of Members Retiring, Running for 
Reelection, or Seeking Higher Office 
Variable Retiring Reelection Higher Office 
Age 59.6 51.4 46.6 
Republican 0.47 0.41 0.50 
Chair/Leader 0.09 0.05 0.01 
Ideol. Pos., Dem. 0.61 0.50 0.43 
Ideol. Pos., Rep. 0.54 0.50 0.49 
Institutional Reform 0.21 0.13 0.16 
Previous Margin 0.71 0.70 0.67 
Scandal 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Redistricting 0.03 0.01 0.04 
Senate Election 0.31 0.32 0.76 
Constit. Overlap 0.11 0.12 0.27 
Open Seat- Senate 0.11 0.10 0.35 
Open Seat -Governor 0.31 0.30 0.43 
N= 8353 
Table 3.2 
Analysis of Congressional Career Decisions, 1947-1986 
Estimation of the Choice Model 
137 
Variable Retire vs. Run for Seek Higher Office Seek Higher Office 
Reelection vs. Run for Reelection vs. Retire 
(~1 - ~2) t-stat. <133- ~2) t-stat. (j33-~1) t-stat. 
constant -8.79 -14.8 .... 1.18 1.8 9.98 11.2 .... 
Age 0.07 13.5 .... -0.04 -5.6 .... -0.12 -12.3 .... 
Republican 0.94 3.9 .... -0.48 -1.7 -1.43 -3.9 .... 
Chair I Leader -0.20 -1.0 -0.86 -1.2 -0.67 -0.9 
Ideol. Pos., Dem. 1.46 5.1 .... -1.22 -3.1 .... -2.69 -5.6 .... 
Ideol. Pos., Rep. 0.20 0.8 0.18 0.5 -0.02 -0.1 
Institutional Reform 0.29 2.2 .. 0.41 2.1 .. 0.12 0.5 
Previous Margin -0.004 -1.1 -0.000 -0.1 0.003 0.6 
Scandal 1.94 5.4 .... 
Redistricting 0.87 2.6 .... 1.77 4.7 .... 0.93 1.9 
Constit. Overlap -0.06 -0.8 0.94 13.1 .... 1.00 10.2 .... 
Senate Election -0.07 -0.5 1.10 5.6 .... 1.17 5.0 .... 
Open Seat- Senate 0.22 1.1 0.82 5.o•• 0.60 2.4 .. 
Open Seat- Governor -0.07 -0.7 0.35 2.4 .. 0.43 2.3 .. 
Log-Likelihood initial: -7785.6 
at converg.: -2185.4 
Number of Observations: 8353 
Significant at 0.01 level . Significant at 0.05 level 
138 
Table 3.3 
The Effects of Independent Variables on Choice Probabilities 
Variable 
With Three Choices With Two Choices 
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 
Age 3.57 -0.08 -2.51 3.47 -0.21 
Republican 1.71 -0.05 -0.05 1.69 -0.06 
Ideol. Pos. Dem. 0.33 -0.01 -0.20 0.42 -0.02 
Institutional Reform 0.30 -0.04 0.45 0.33 -0.02 
Scandal 4.64 -0.18 -0.18 4.55 -0.20 
Redistricting 0.88 -0.20 3.85 1.20 -0.06 
Constit. Overlap -0.04 -0.04 0.89 - -
Senate Election -0.05 -0.05 2.54 - -
Open Seat - Senate -0.06 -0.06 1.11 - -
Open Seat- Governor -0.01 -0.01 0.39 - -
Number of Observations 4922 3431 
Figure 3.1 139 
Sources of House Membership Turnover 
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Previous Research: Problems in Sample Treatment 
1. Voluntary retirement 2. Progressive ambition 
[J Run for re-election (92.3 %) 
s::J Retire (4.6 %) 
~ Run for higher office (3.1 %) 
• The conditional choice probabilities are interpreted as unconditional. 
• No knowledge about the intercorrelation of all available choices. 
• May fail to identify relevant variables. 
3. Schansburg (1992) 
13 3 choices, have an opportunity 
for higher office (62%) 
&'1 2 choices, no opportunity for 
higher office (38%) 
Treated as having 3 choices in Schansburg (1992). 
Figure 3.3 
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